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THE ETHICS BACKLASH AND THE INDEPENDENT 
COUNSEL STATUTE 
George D. Brown' 
In this Article, Professor George D. Brown explores the role of the 
Office of Independent Counsel and the current ethics backlash 
surrounding its reauthorization. He examines the historical 
development of the institution through the accounts of two previous 
"special prosecutors,» Archibald Cox and Lawrence Walsh. Professor 
Brown also explores the arguments of critics who call for the 
institution's abolition and counters with his own call for change and 
renewal. As an alternative to renewal, he suggests a short-term 
extension, a "cooling off' period to permit Congress to take a 
detached look at the independent counsel. 
Professor Brown observes that the current reauthorization debate 
arises in the midst of a counterrevolution in government ethics. 
Despite this ethics backlash, he suggests that the statute be modified 
without severely altering the role of the independent counsel. 
Professor Brown continues by examining current proposals to revise 
the Office of Independent Counsel, which include: limiting the 
covered crimes; reducing the number of covered persons; modifying 
the role of the attorney general; specifying the qualifications of the 
independent counsel; limiting the cost and duration of investigations; 
changing the manner in which the independent counsel reports its 
findings to Congress and the judiciary; and limiting expansion of its 
jurisdiction. Professor Brown concludes, however, that whatever the 
fate of the offered revisions, it is essential that the Office of 
Independent Counsel remain "independent.» 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Chair, Massachusetts State 
Ethics Commission 1994-1998; Assistant Independent Counsel, Office of Indepen-
dent Counsel Donald C. Smaltz, May 1998 to present. The views expressed herein 
are those of the author. Research support for this project was made possible by a 
grant from the Boston College Law School Dean's Fund. 
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"I wouldn't have trusted Ed Meese to prosecute Ronald Reagan and 
1 don't trust Janet Reno to prosecute Bill Clinton." 
Congressman Henry Hyde l 
INTRODUCTION 
The scenario has a familiar ring. In the face of scandal, the De-
partment of Justice is attacked "for its lack of objectivity and collu-
sion with the White House.,,2 A special prosecutor is named, but his 
lack of prosecutorial experience is a potential liability. His critics 
attack him almost from the outset.3 In particular, the White House 
sees him as ''bent on toppling" the presidency and conducting a "'per-
petual inquisition.",4 Certainly, the special prosecutor's highly parti-
san background, including active participation in a political cam-
paign against the incumbent president, helps reinforce such accusa-
tions.5 He assembles a team of "'aggressive, prosecutorial, 
ambitious'" lawyers, and the number of these "hungry, young prose-
cutors" grows quickly.6 The office of the president accuses the special 
prosecutor of engaging in a "'blanket fishing expedition.",7 More seri-
ous is the argument that the work of the special prosecutor could do 
"'long term damage' to the office of the presidency," a danger that 
requires the invocation of executive privilege.8 The special prosecutor 
engages in the classic prosecutorial maneuver of "rolling over" lesser 
figures in order- to get at higher-ups, with the White House as the 
ultimate goal.9 He seems to view what started out as an apparently 
mundane case as hiding serious issues of possible abuse of power and 
obstruction of justice. Kenneth Starr? No, Archibald Cox. 
The availability of Ken Gormley's book, Conscience of a Nation, an 
in-depth examination of Cox's work as special prosecutor and its 
impact, is fortuitous. The nation is engaged in a heated debate over 
the future of the institution of a semi-permanent special prosecutor, 
now referred to as the independent counsel. The debate will come to 
a head in the l06th Congress, which must consider whether to renew 
1. Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent 
Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 1515, 1598 (1998) [hereinafter Judicial Conference]. 
2. KEN GoRMLEY, ARCIDBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 235 (1997). 
3. See id. 
4. See id. at 296. 
5. See id. at 115, 266-67. 
6. See id. at 264. 
7. See id. at 277 (quotation omitted). 
8. See id. at 276 (discussing perceived need to invoke executive privilege in 
order to protect the office of the presidency). 
9. See id. at 279. 
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the authorizing legislation or let it expire in June of 1999.10 The 
controversy is wide-ranging, raising not only legal and political is-
sues, but broader questions about how to achieve public confidence in 
government without undermining the institutions of that government 
and damaging the careers of those who serve it. There is a string of 
extraordinary dramas, notably, but not exclusively, that of the 
Whitewater investigation and the resultant impeachment. There is 
also, in the background, a growing intellectual trend that will bear 
directly on the public policy contentions: a counterrevolution in gov-
ernment ethics that calls into question many of the anti-corruption 
initiatives of the post-Watergate era, including the independent coun-
sel.H Apart from elite views, the public generally may be in the ear-
ly stages of an ethics backlash that views President Clinton as a 
victim and the independent counsel as an overzealous, partisan pros-
ecutor. Needless to say, the White House and its allies have played a 
substantial role in encouraging this trend. 
One of the goals of this Article is to provide a foundation for un-
derstanding the ongoing debate beyond its partisan dimensions. I 
will draw primarily on three significant recent texts. Besides the 
Gormley work, this Article will consider Lawrence Walsh's 
Firewall,12 and the important contribution to government-ethics lit-
erature by Peter Morgan and Glenn Reynolds entitled The Appear-
ance of Impropriety. 13 
The first two books deal directly with the work of an independent 
counselor special prosecutor, providing a look at the inner workings 
of this important institution. The third, by Morgan and Reynolds, 
devotes a relatively small portion of its pages to the independent 
counsel directly, but constitutes an excellent introduction to the 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (Supp. 1998) provides as follows: 
This chapter shall cease to be effective five years after the date of the 
enactment of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, ex-
cept that this chapter shall continue in effect with respect to then pend-
ing matters before an independent counsel that in the judgment of such 
counsel require such continuation until that independent counsel deter-
mines such matters have been completed. 
11. See, e.g., SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL 6 (1995) (criticizing "the increased 
enthusiasm with which the political system man hunts evil in politics and the 
ever-growing efficiency with which our modern scandal production machine oper-
ates"). 
12. LAWRENCE WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-
UP (1997). 
13. PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN W. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRI-
ETY: How THE ETHICS WARS HAVE UNDERMINED AMERICAN GoVERNMENT, BUSI-
NESS, AND SOCIETY (1997). 
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broader issue of the counterrevolution in government ethics and how 
far it should extend. In particular, Morgan and Reynolds raise the 
question of whether the Office of Independent Counsel will be the 
counterrevolution's first victim. 
The role of the independent counsel is foreshadowed in Gormley's 
biography, an examination of Cox's entire life and career. More than 
one third of the volume deals directly with what has become known 
as "Watergate" and Cox's role as special prosecutor in the scandal 
that launched a generation of ethics initiatives. 14 Thus, we see both 
the beginning of the mechanism and a preview of many of its future 
problems. ,My focus on this text will be the extent to which it shows 
how the events of 1973 laid the groundwork for today's debate. As 
Gormley points out, the mechanism of a permanent independent 
counsel did not spring into being immediately after the firing of Cox 
and Nixon's ultimate resignation.16 It took almost five years for the 
independent counsel chapter of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 
to be enacted. 16 Cox himself was not a major actor in the debates 
that led to the bill. 17 His contribution consisted of showing-through 
the Watergate investigation-what such an office could do under 
modem political and media conditions. 
Through Lawrence Walsh's Firewall/8 we see the independent 
counsel at work in its full-blown development. The perspective is not 
that of the scholarly biographer such as Gormley. Rather, this is a 
view from the heat of battle coming from one of the key participants: 
the independent counsel himself. Walsh was appointed under the Act 
in its current, semi-permanent form to investigate the Iran-Contra 
matter.19 As with Cox, the fact that the investigation could well 
reach the presidency influenced everything that happened during it. 
Similarities abound, in particular, the attitude of the White House 
and those who defended its position. 
Walsh's account must, of course, be taken with more than a grain 
14. See GARMENT, supra note 11, at 6-7 (discussing impact of Watergate on 
views toward political corruption); Gormley, supra note 2, at 229-392. 
15. See GORMLEY, supra note 2, at 431. 
16. See id. at 381 (noting Cox's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee concerning special prosecutor legislation in October 1973). An excellent discus-
sion of the development of independe~t counsel legislation after Watergate can be 
found in KNIT J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSE-
CUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 40-72 (1992). See also Katy J. Harriger, The History 
of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the Past Informs the Current Debate, 
49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 490 (1998) ("[TJhe issues at the center of the debate . . . 
were there from the start."). 
17. See GORMLEY, supra note 2, at 380. 
18. WALSH, supra note 12. 
19. See id. at 26. 
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of salt. It is something of a justification, in the form of the last, last 
word. The independent counsel writes a report for the special court 
that appoints him.20 The reports, which are usually released to the 
public, have become one of the most controversial aspects of the en-
tire independent counsel mechanism. 21 In particular, analysts have 
charged that a public document gives the independent counsel the 
chance to make accusations which could not be proved in court but 
can seriously harm the subject's reputation.22 In Firewall, Walsh is 
freed from whatever constraints might hedge a government report of 
this type. He uses that freedom in a manner that can fairly be called 
polemical. For example, his repeated salvoes at former Senate Minor-
ity Leader Robert Dole23 show that after a six-year investigation 
there are scores to be settled. Thus, we learn what the independent 
counsel can do as well as what his limits are, particularly when the 
investigation involves the president and issues of national security. 
Walsh's fundamental message is threefold: first, he, as an 
independent counsel, went as far as he could under the circumstanc-
es but could not breach the firewall; second, the interaction between 
Congress and the independent counsel can pose extraordinary com-
plications when they are investigating the same matter; and third, 
he acted as any prosecutor would. Indeed, it is this third point that 
makes Walsh's observations particularly relevant to current argu-
ments over the future of the independent counsel. 
Opponents of the independent counsel mechanism can point to 
Walsh's "failures" as evidence of what is wrong. A vast expenditure 
of time and money turned up little that ordinary processes of prose-
cution and congressional hearings would not have revealed. The· 
political fallout was extensive, perhaps even costing the incumbent 
president the election, and many reputations and careers were seri-
ously damaged. Proponents of the independent counsel, on the other 
hand, can argue that we need a mechanism outside of ordinary pro-
cesses to get as far as Walsh did and to put what he found in the 
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) (Supp. 1998). 
21. See, e.g., Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad 
Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 496-501 (1996) (criticizing operation of reporting 
requirement). The independent counsel's report is required in all cases and is 
separate from the requirement of reporting to Congress "any substantial and credi~ 
ble information which such independent counsel receives, in carrying out the inde-
pendent counsel's responsibilities under this chapter, that may constitute grounds 
for an impeachment." 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1993). 
22. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 21; Judicial Conference, supra note 1, at 
1582 (remarks of Terry H. Eastland discussing reporting requirement and possible 
abuses). 
23. See, e.g., WALSH, supra note 12, at 314, 467-69. 
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public record. Thus, proponents can argue that his failure, if it was 
one, is less a result of Walsh's misjudgments or the faults of the 
institution than a result of the inherent difficulties of any high pro-
file investigation of the president.24 Finally, it is important to note 
the kinship between the controversies Archibald Cox generated at 
the outset and those Lawrence Walsh generated twenty years later. 
Both accounts illustrate the problems of having an independent coun-
sel which functions outside of the normal institutional mechanism. 
The question whether ordinary prosecution is sufficient for mat-
ters currently covered by the independent counsel mechanism is a 
central theme in the reauthorization debate. A third work to consid-
er, The Appearance of Impropriety by Peter Morgan and Glenn 
Reynolds,25 helps us look at that issue and the broader debate, from 
a totally different angle. Their analysis is applicable to government 
across-the-board as well as to the private sector.26 Morgan and 
Reynolds contend that current societal attitudes overemphasize the 
appearance of ethical behavior.27 This makes it harder to seek and 
apply truly ethical standards and impairs the efficient functioning of 
those who must work under current standards. According to Morgan 
and Reynolds, this overemphasis on appearances leads to the cre-
ation of new machinery that is aimed at improving ethics but may 
actually make matters worse.28 The independent counsel merits dis-
cussion precisely because it is, in Suzanne Garment's words, "a cen-
tral symbol of post-Watergate politics.,,29 Morgan and Reynolds see 
our public life as held hostage to the demands of "an Ethics Estab-
lishment,,30 that wields enormous power due to the broad range of 
components that make it up: the "complex of interest groups, journal-
ists, consultants, government ethics officers, and legislators owing its 
existence to the Watergate scandal.,,31 
Morgan and Reynolds introduce a Inew dimension to the indepen-
dent counsel controversy. They connect it to the broader question of 
how we achieve honesty-and a public perception of honesty-among 
24. Of course Walsh was dealing with a matter that had substantial national 
security overtones. There was little of any such dimension in Watergate, and prob-
ably none in Whitewater. Nonetheless, the problems of investigating the president, 
including the issue of long-term damage to the office, are a constant. 
25. MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13. 
26. See id. at 99-119 (describing spread of "ethics establishment" to business 
world). . 
27. See id. at 2 (stating that "[tlhe emphasis on appearances has been dramat-
ic"). 
28. See id. at 104. 
29. .GARMENT, supra note 11, at 83. 
30. MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 74. 
31. [d. 
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our public officials. Within this larger discussion, Morgan and 
Reynolds place themselves firmly in the camp of critics such as Su-
zanne Garment, and Frank Anechiarico and James Jacobs who be-
lieve that we have gone too far in seeking a degree of perfection that 
cannot be realized, while producing numerous detrimental side ef-
fects on those who must work in this environment.32 Obviously, the 
independent counsel is an integral and highly visible part of the 
institutional machinery that the counterrevolution attacks. Indeed, 
the independent counsel may well be the first victim of this intellec-
tual development. On the eve of congressional action that will decide 
its fate, there is substantial momentum against renewal. While elite 
opinion is influenced by the counterrevolution, a broader-based ethics 
backlash reinforces this trend. 
In Part I of this Article, I give a brief description of the institution 
and an outline of the arguments against it in order to set the stage 
for Part II, a detailed discussion of the empirical and theoretical light 
that Gormley, Walsh, and Morgan and Reynolds shed on the overall 
debate. In Part III, I present arguments for renewing the indepen-
dent counsel. My goal is to draw lessons from the Cox and Walsh 
experiences to demonstrate that certain problems are endemic to the 
mechanism regardless of who is in charge, and to rebut critiques of 
those such as Morgan and Reynolds and other observers who have 
called for abolition of the mechanism. In particular, I focus on what I 
consider a number of key fallacies in the arguments of the critics 
while recognizing that their views must be taken into account. 
In Part IV, I consider whether, recognizing the validity of some of 
the criticisms, there may be a middle ground: retaining the law while 
making substantial changes to it. This course of action appears to 
have considerable support among a broad range of observers and key 
players in the debate.33 My goal in Part IV is to consider all of the 
possible changes that have appeared as serious considerations of the 
still fluid debate. In particular, I focus on recent legislative propos-
als. My conclusion is that attempting to make a root-and-branch 
alteration of the independent counsel statute is simply not possible. 
There is less "wiggle" room than advocates of change seem to hope. 
Some alterations in areas such as covered persons, crimes eligible for 
32. See GARMENT, supra note 11; FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, 
THE PuRsUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY: How CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKEs GOVERN-
MENT INEFFECTIVE 153 (1996) (recounting a recent empirical study of government 
ethics enforcement in New York City). . 
33. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Former Special Counsels See Need to Alter Law 
That Created Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at Al (discussing broad consensus 
among former independent counsels "that the statute was needed but might have 
to be overhauled if it was to be renewed by Congress when it expires next year"). 
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investigation, and the role of the attorney general appear to hold 
promise for change that goes beyond the level of "tinkering," howev-
er.34 Thus we might well see a somewhat different mechanism; but 
if Congress were to attempt to change the independent counsel mech-
anism radically, there is a real possibility that the counsel who oper-
ates under it would no longer be independent. Recognizingthis possi-
bility, Congress may conclude that the choice is between retention 
and abolition, and simply opt for the latter. The issue is complex and 
important, however. A rush to judgment is not the answer. A short-
term extension might be the answer in order to permit review and 
deliberation. 
I. THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL MECHANISM AND THE DRUMBEAT OF 
CRITICISM AS RENEWAL APPROACHES 
A. The Independent Counsel Mechanism 
Few federal employees ever encounter the independent counsel 
mechanism except in newspapers and television. Its provisions are 
applicable only to a small group of high level officials generally re-
ferred to as "covered persons.,,35 The high officials in question are 
essentially the president, vice-president, cabinet officials, senior De-
partment of Justice officials, senior White House staff, and certain 
other specified individuals such as the director of Central Intelli-
gence.36 The issue with respect to such persons is whether they will 
be investigated and potentially prosecuted by an independent counsel 
for having "violated any Federal criminal law other than a violation 
classified as a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction.'>37 The 
attorney general is involved in a two-stage proceeding leading to the 
decision to appoint an independent counsel. She must conduct an 
initial screening of information concerning possible commission of a 
covered crime by a covered person in order to determine whether to 
proceed to the more formal second step of a "preliminary" investiga-
tion.38 The key factor at this initial stage is whether the attorney 
general has received information that is either specific or from a 
34. See O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 505 (discussing the approach of "tinker-
ing" with the statute). Professor O'Sullivan reaches the conclusion that the effect 
of any changes would not be sufficient to cure what she views as fundamental 
flaws in the mechanism. See id. 
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1993 & Supp. 1998) (listing persons to whom stat-
ute applies). 
36. See id. § 591(b)(1)-(7). 
37. [d. § 591(a). 
38. See id. § 591(c). 
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credible source.39 If not, she may close the matter.40 If, however, 
there is enough to satisfy this initial screening, the attorney general 
proceeds to the ninety-day preliminary investigation.41 The goal of 
the preliminary investigation is to determine whether the indepen-
dent counsel mechanism is warranted for the matter in question. The 
key factor in this determination is whether there are "reasonable 
grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted."42 Unless 
the attorney general can state that no such grounds exist, the matter 
moves to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia, which "shall appoint an appropriate independent coun-
sel and shall define that independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdic-
tion.,,43 Once the independent counsel is appointed, that person 
takes over and begins a process of investigation and potential prose-
cution.44 
The independent counsel enjoys a broad range of authority includ-
ing the power to exercise virtually all "investigative and prosecutori-
al functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the attorney 
general, and any other officer or employee of the Department of Jus-
tice. "45 Thus, the independent counsel can investigate and litigate 
like any other federal prosecutor. Particularly important is the inde-
pendent counsel's ability to "appoint, fix the compensation, and as-
sign the duties of such employees as such independent counsel con-
siders necessary (including investigators, attorneys, and part-time 
consultants).,,46 It is this open-ended budgetary authority that has 
led to much of the controversy over the cost of highly publicized in-
vestigations such as those by Lawrence Walsh and Kenneth Starr. 
The independent counsel must also file a final report with the Spe-
cial Division, as well as Congress. In addition, reporting to Congress 
includes the now famous requirement of advising the House of Repre-
sentatives "of any substantial and credible information which such 
independent counsel receives, in carrying out the independent 
counsel's responsibilities under this chapter, that may constitute 
39. See id. § 591(d)(1). 
40. See id. § 591(d)(2). 
41. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1) (1993); see also id. § 591(c) (treating possible 
conflicts of interest on the part of the attorney general as grounds for commencing 
a preliminary investigation of persons otherwise not covered). 
42. Id. § 592(b)(1) (1993). 
43. Id. § 593(b)(1) (1993). It should be noted that in conducting the prelimi-
nary investigation, the attorney general is not given such normal prosecutorial 
tools as the authority to convene grand juries, grant immunity, or issue subpoe-
nas. See id. § 592(b)(2) (1993). 
44. See id. § 593(b)(3) (1993). 
45. Id. § 594(a) (1993). 
46. Id. § 594(c) (Supp. 1998). 
HeinOnline -- 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 442 1998-1999
442 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.51:433 
grounds for an impeachment."47 
There is also a provision for removal of the independent counsel. 
The statute provides, 
An independent counsel appointed under this chapter may be re-
moved from office, other than by impeachment and conviction, only 
by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for good 
cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition 
that substantially impairs the performance of such independent 
counsel's duties:8 
The experience under this provision, however, has not been one of 
close supervision by the attorney general through use of the removal 
power.49 
The result of all the provisions relating to the power and status of 
the independent counsel is that, once appointed, the independent 
counsel really is independent and an extremely powerful prosecutor 
with the ability to have a substantial impact on the lives of his sub-
jects. In part, it is this power and its potential for abuse that have 
led to the criticisms of the mechanism that I propose to examine in 
the remainder of this section. My analysis will focus on the 
opposition's main themes. I should note, however, that strictly speak-
ing, the burden of proof is on those who would renew the statute. I 
do not feel that a "sunset" provision can be read fairly as creating a 
presumption that a law should remain in place unless good reasons 
develop to abolish it. 
In any event, what is striking about the present debate is the 
extraordinary outpouring of opposition to the independent counsel 
mechanism, with a relatively tepid response on the part of its defend-
ers. The critics range from politicians and those with direct experi-
ence of the law's operation, to academic observers taking a somewhat 
broader perspective. The current status of the debate is that momen-
tum is with the critics, but those critics must still get around the fact 
that it is politically difficult for an elected federal lawmaker to op-
pose the most visible anti-corruption mechanism in the American 
system. 50 The critics, well aware of this, have attempted with some 
success to create an intellectual and political climate in which it is 
safe to be in opposition. The possibility of a generalized ethics back-
lash reinforces this climate. The critics' arguments can be grouped 
47. [d. § 595(c). 
48. [d. § 596(a)(1) (Supp. 1998). 
49. But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (emphasizing the im-
portance of removal power in sustaining the independent counsel statute against 
constitutional attack). 
50. See id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing political constraints). 
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under a number of categories. 
B. The Principal Categories of Arguments Against the 
Independent Counsel 
1. Civil Liberties Arguments 
443 
Some of the most forceful contentions against the operation of the 
independent counsel mechanism can be grouped under the general 
heading of concern for the civil liberties of the subjects of investiga-
tion and prosecution. 51 One such concern is that the various incen-
tives an independent counsel faces to do a successful job lead to 
much more vigorous prosecution than normaL The result is both 
financial and personal expense to the persons involved on the other 
end. As Professor O'Sullivan puts it, 
The most obvious objection to providing an IC [Independent Coun-
sel] with so much power, so many resources, and so broad a man-
date is that it may, and given the IC's incentives probably will, 
subject the targets of IC investigations to far greater scrutiny and 
violate their privacy much more than would be the case if the tar-
gets were private citizens. 52 
The civil liberties critique does not stop with the manner of the 
prosecution itself. Another issue analysts have identified is the ex-
traordinary publicity surrounding the subject and his alleged wrong-
doing as a result of an independent counsel's investigation. 53 In par-
ticular, the public report submitted at the end of an independent 
counsel inquiry has drawn the ire of many critics.54 They note that 
the public release of such a report is the antithesis of what would 
occur under normal circumstances after grand jury proceedings. 55 
51. See Joseph E. DiGenova, The Independent Counsel Act: A Good Time to 
End a Bad Idea, 86 GEO. L.J. 2299, 2304 (1998) (referring to the threat to "civil 
liberties of high level government officials"); Thomas S. Martin & David E. 
Zerhusen, Independent Counsel-Checks and Balances, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 536, 
539 (1990) (discussing the executive branch's loss of "individual rights" under the 
independent counsel statute). 
52. O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 488. The theme of incentives runs throughout 
the literature on the independent counsel. See, e.g., id. at 475, 477, 485, 495; 
MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 79 ("An Independent Counsel is likely to 
leave few stones unturned in investigating a target, and less likely to exercise 
discretion by not prosecuting for merely technical or minor offenses."). See general· 
ly Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267 
(1998). 
53. See, e.g., GARMENT, supra note 11, at 90, 97. 
54. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 484-85. 
55. See, e.g., id. at 499-500 (describing the valuable role of the grand jury in 
protecting accused persons). 
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Even if the subject is indicted, he may be found not guilty, or guilty 
of relatively minor offenses. For the independent counsel, but not the 
ordinary prosecutor, this opens the possibility of discussing culpa-
bility for greater offenses in the final report, even though he obtained 
no such convictions, or they may have been reversed in the actual 
proceedings. 
2. Partisanship 
Critics often note how partisanship has the potential to vitiate 
independent counsel investigations and prosecutions. 56 This phe-
nomenon takes many forms, for example, charges that the selection 
of an independent counsel was based on political considerations.57 
Professor O'Sullivan emphasizes that the high political stakes in any 
independent counsel inquiry virtually ensure that the opposition will 
attack the independent counsel as partisan.58 The charges of parti-
sanship are likely to extend to the conduct and consequences of the 
investigation, as evidenced by the Bush camp's insistence that parti-
sanship played a central role in Lawrence Walsh's indictment of 
Casper Weinberger shortly before the election of 1992.59 The politi-
cal party of the individual being investigated is likely to develop 
reservations about the independent counsel statute while opponents 
are likely to see it as a way of rooting out corruption in the executive 
branch. The institution was created by a Democratic Congress. Re-
publicans, however, have come to see the independent counsel mech-
anism as beneficial when Democrats find that their ox is being 
gored.60 At times it seems that political support for, or opposition to, 
the Office of the Independent Counsel ebbs and flows with the locus 
of political power. In fact, the outcome of the 1998 congressional elec-
tions will determine the future of the institution. In this respect, the 
Democrats' strong showing in the 1998 congressional elections bodes 
ill for the independent counsel. 
56. See, e.g., id. at 471-75 (discussing various forms and sources of partisan-
ship during recent independent counsel investigations). 
57. See id. at 471-73. 
58. See id. at 471. 
59. See, e.g., WALSH, supra note 12, at 447-50 (describing the dramatic impact 
of a January 7, 1986 note indicating President Bush's knowledge of an "arms for 
hostages" trade and Buggesting the exploitation of the memo by the Democratic 
presidential campaign); see also GARMENT, supra note 11, at 99 (referring to "the 
incorrigibly partisan character of the legislation"). 
60. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 472 (noting the phenomenon of 
"Republican converts" favoring the independent counsel statute when the issue was 
the Whitewater investigation of President Clinton). 
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3. The Independent Counsel and the Presidency 
In his oft-cited dissent in Morrison v. Olson,6! Justice Scalia 
stressed that the independent counsel mechanism would weaken the 
president both as the person who controls federal prosecutions and as 
the potential direct or indirect target of any such prosecution.62 He 
focused on the latter aspect from a separation of powers perspective, 
and argued that control of prosecutions was an advantage that the 
founders intended to give to the executive for use during its inevita-
ble confrontations with Congress.63 As Justice Scalia put it, 
Besides weakening the Presidency by reducing the zeal of his staff, 
it must also be obvious that the institution of the independent coun-
sel enfeebles him more directly in his constant confrontations with 
Congress, by eroding his public support. Nothing is so politically 
effective as the ability to charge that one's opponent and his associ-
ates are not merely wrong-headed, naive, ineffective, but, in all 
probability, "crooks. "64 
It is certainly the case that in every major investigation involving 
the president, defenders of the executive have noted the risk of weak-
ening the executive branch and distracting the president from more 
important matters facing the country.65 
4. The Independent Counsel as a Flawed Prosecutorial 
Mechanism 
Many critical analysts focus on what they see as differences be-
tween the independent counsel mechanism and normal prosecutorial 
procedures. They argue that the latter are preferable for many rea-
sons.66 Besides the issue of incentives discussed above, critics focus 
on the lack of budgetary constraints and general accountability.67 
Additionally, commentators frequently complain about the tendency 
61. 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
62. See id. at 708-09. 
63. See id. at 712-15. 
64. [d. at 713. 
65. See, e.g., GoRMLEY, supra note 2, at 276 (recounting the concern of Presi-
dent Nixon's advisors over damage to the functioning of the office). 
66. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 483-85 (contending that an indepen-
dent counsel investigation, unlike all other criminal inquiries, is afforded virtually 
unlimited resources and time and is subject to greater political scrutiny, ensuring 
that any investigation will be probing to the point of intrusiveness). 
67. See, e.g., MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 76 (noting the lack of 
"political control"); O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 493-94 (outlining the lack of ac· 
countability); id. at 501-03 (comparing the high cost of some investigations to the 
financial operations of United States Attorneys' offices). 
HeinOnline -- 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 446 1998-1999
446 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vo1.51:433 
of independent counsels to focus on trivial offenses, which a prosecu-
tor handling a broad scale of criminal matters would supposedly 
choose not to pursue.68 
Perhaps the most serious objection to the independent counsel 
mechanism in contrast to ordinary prosecution is that it subverts the 
function of prosecuting crimes by turning it into a judgment about 
fitness for office. Morgan and Reynolds, for example, warn about 
turning "debates about right and wrong into discussions of criminali-
ty and [turning] a finding of 'not actually criminal' into something 
that is politically advertised as a vindication."69 Professor 
O'Sullivan, in particular, argues that what is at work is a serious 
misuse of the prosecutorial function in making decisions about ethi-
cal conduct or political fitness for office, which puts the prosecutor in 
the position of making judgments that he is neither "qualified [n]or 
equipped to fulfil1.,,70 Such judgments, O'Sullivan argues, are essen-
tially political tasks, at total variance with the normal court-focused 
job of the American prosecutor "to use the awesome powers of his 
office to determine whether criminal conduct has been committed 
and if so by whom.'m 
5. The Preferred Role of the Political Process 
Given the viewpoint that the independent counsel mechanism 
trespasses upon the proper role of the political process, it is only a 
small step to conclude that the mechanism, in fact, weakens the 
political process by allowing or forcing those· who should make the 
hard decisions to stand by while a new, fourth branch of government 
does the job of elected officials. Certainly, Congress can conduct over-
sight hearings and possesses the ultimate weapon of impeachment of 
the same officials who are subject to independent counsel jurisdic-
tion. Its incentives to take action are weakened, however, because 
someone else is available to do the job and bear the political costs. 
Many critics argue that Watergate, far from justifying such an ex-
treme measure as creation of the independent counsel, demonstrates 
68. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 483-85 (asserting that "normal" 
prosecutors would be limited by resource constraints from pursuing minor viola-
tions in ways an independent counsel would not). 
69. MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 79; see also HARRIGER, supra note 
16, at 206-07 ("[B]y turning [ethics] allegations over to an officer whose jurisdic-
tion is restricted to criminal matters, a full and open debate about the behavior is 
stifled. The central question of 'ethical fitness' is lost to a discussion of whether 
the target is a criminal or not."). 
70. O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 507-08. 
71. [d. at 508. 
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that the political process worked.72 In sum, those who focus on the 
political dimension of the independent counsel's work argue that it 
ends up subverting the very processes that it is meant to protect, and 
that these processes could function well without it, if challenged to 
do so. 
6. Unequal Treatment of Covered Persons 
Critics see another negative effect on American politics from the 
functioning of the independent counsel mechanism: the danger of 
unequal treatment of covered persons who may be subject to a harsh-
er brand of justice than ordinary citizens.73 Here, there is a danger 
of subverting the governmental, non-electoral processes. It is impor-
tant not to create disincentives to public service. Yet, the argument 
runs, there is a real risk that people will be unwilling to take jobs 
that may subject them to an independent counsel prosecution with 
all of its ramifications. The day it was announced that, after an at-
torney general's preliminary investigation, Secretary of the Interior 
Bruce Babbitt would be the subject of an independent counsel inves-
tigation, he declared that "'the list of hidden costs one has to pay for 
public service has just grown a little longer.',,74 
7. The Counterrevolution in Government Ethics and the Broader 
Critique of Current Rules and Enforcement Mechanisms 
Morgan and Reynolds, among others, argue that our society has 
reached a point of overemphasizing government ethics. 75 The result 
is not only the creation of an "Ethics Establishment."76 It has seri-
ous consequences for the government and the governed. I previously 
mentioned the possibility that high-level executive branch employees 
may be reluctant to serve and face the prospect of an independent 
counsel investigation. Among a broader spectrum of government 
employees '''who must negotiate this ritual, the result is frustration 
and alienation."'" Professor Robert Vaughn also views the increas-
72. See, e.g., id. at 505-06. 
73. See, e.g., id. at 488-90 (discussing whether treatment of high public offi-
cials is more "harsh and invasive" than what ordinary citizens receive). 
74. David Johnston, Reno Requesting a Counsel to Look at Babbitt Moues, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at Al. 
75. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 98 (explaining that "[alt no 
time in the history of our country has government ethics been more intensively 
scrutinized and extensively regulated") (citation omitted). 
76. See id. at 74. 
77. [d. at 98 (quoting ABA Comm. on Gov't Standards, Cynthia Farina, Re-
porter, Keeping Faith: Gouernment Ethics and Gouernment Ethics Regulation, 45 
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ing recourse to "legalism," as detrimental to encouraging individual 
initiative in ethical matters on the part of government employees. 78 
The real risk behind an increased reliance on rules for everything is 
that employees will either not take ethical standards seriously or will 
take them so seriously and spend so much time on paper compliance 
that accomplishment of their assigned tasks will suffer.79 Nor is it 
clear whether a plethora of ethics rules and new means of enforce-
ment increases public confidence in government, the ultimate goal. 
Morgan and Reynolds note that despite all of these efforts, "faith in 
government. . . has probably never been lower."8o The notion that 
we are overdoing enforcement extends to the institution of the inde-
pendent counsel. Suzanne Garment, who typifies growing counterrev-
olution sentiment against the institution, states: 
The publicity of the independent counsel process is also ill suited to 
promoting general confidence in the quality and character of federal 
officials. Political Washington may be mollified by it, but in the long 
run, the effect is the opposite: Citizens learn from these investiga-
tions that they had more grounds than they ever imagined for mis-
trusting the morals and competence of their political leaders. 81 
8. The Starr Factor 
Discussing the controversies surrounding the renewal of the inde-
pendent counsel law without discussing at length the Whitewater 
investigation by Judge Kenneth Starr, and the resultant impeach-
ment, might seem like Hamlet without the Prince. Judge Starr is 
undoubtedly a central figure in current controversies. His critics see 
him as a vengeful and partisan prosecutor, perhaps the embodiment 
of earlier predictions of the risk of a "runaway" independent prosecu-
tor.82 To his supporters, Judge Starr is a conscientious prosecutor 
ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 290 (1993)). 
78. See Robert Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public Service, 
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 419 (1990) (concluding that an increase in ethics 
regulations will lead to a decrease in effective assessment of ethical values in 
public service). 
79. See, e.g., ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note 32, at 179-80 (arguing that 
"goal displacement" is occurring in the combat of corruption whereby the adher-
ence to rules becomes the primary task as opposed to ferreting out crime). 
80. MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 1; see Norman J. Ornstein, Doing 
Congress's Dirty Work, 86 GEO. L.J. 2179, 2179-81 (1998) (noting paradox of public 
distrust while experts view politics as less corrupt· than in the past). 
81. GARMENT, supra note 11, at 98. 
82. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, The Grand Inquisitor, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1998, 
at A27 (stating that Starr has gone beyond the bounds of behavior for a prosecu-
tor). Professor Harriger has noted that "just as the special prosecutor office was 
born out of the crisis of Watergate, it may take a similar abuse of power by a 
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who has been the victim of an orchestrated campaign of delay and 
. vilification.83 The New York Times went so far as to publish a lead 
editorial entitled "Fairness for Ken Starr."84 
No doubt many in Congress will base their renewal decision vote 
on their assessment of the Whitewater investigation and its results, 
thus making renewal a referendum on that matter. Certainly, the 
emergence of an ethics backlash that views President Clinton as a 
victim and seeks to punish his accusers will play a powerful role. It 
is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that virtually 
every issue in the current debate was present, at least in latent form, 
during the work of previous special prosecutors and independent 
counsels.85 In the next section of this Article, I consider the contri-
butions of Gormley, Walsh, and Morgan and Reynolds in more detail, 
and discuss how they shed light on the renewal debate. 
II. THREE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ETHICS DEBATE AND 
THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 
A. Archibald Cox-Present Before the Creation 
In Archibald Cox, Professor Ken Gormley offers a portrait of the 
illustrious career of this extraordinary academic. Gormley begins the 
obligatory treatment of family and upbringing with a provocative 
flashback to the Senate's impeachment trial of President Andrew 
Johnson on April 28, 1868.86 William Maxwell Evarts, Johnson's 
special prosecutor to instigate a reexamination of the desirability of having an 
independent prosecutor's office with so few formal checks on it." HARRIGER, supra 
note 16, at 167. 
83. See, e.g., Tucker Carlson, Trashing Kenneth Starr, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 
June 29, 1998, at 8 (describing conscious attempts by the opposition to weaken 
Starr's credibility). 
84. Editorial, Fairness for Ken Starr; N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, § 4, at 14. 
Despite the extensive publicity given to Judge Starr's investigation, and the pro-
gression from Whitewater to the Monica Lewinsky matter to impeachment, I do 
not propose to discuss extensively the impact of Whitewater on the renewal debate 
in this article. This decision is due, in part, to my affiliation with another inde-
pendent counsel office. In addition, it must be noted that the role of the "Starr 
factor" changes almost daily, as the public reacts to his investigation and the 
impeachment of President Clinton. Moreover, my goal is to focus on broader insti-
tutional concerns that go beyond current headlines. 
85. See, e.g., Katy Harriger, Damned If She Does and Damned If She Doesn't: 
The Attorney General and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2097, 
2104 (1998) (arguing that the initial compromise over the Attorney General's pow-
er "is. at the root of the controversies that have swirled around the implementa-
tion" of the independent counsel statute). 
86. See GoRMLEY, supra note 2, at 15-22. 
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principal defender, was Cox's great-grandfather.B7 The importance of 
lineage and family is a theme that recurs throughout Cox's life and 
career, rooted as they were in the proverbial eastern establish-
ment.BB 
After Harvard College and Harvard Law School, Cox obtained the 
all important clerkship with Learned Hand, arranged by then Profes-
sor Felix Frankfurter.89 The biography continues with the initial 
years at the prestigious Boston firm of Ropes & Gray, the early call 
to public service in Washington, and the beginning of Cox's career as 
a professor at Harvard Law Schoo1.90 Particularly intriguing is the 
discussion of his association with the political career of John F. Ken-
nedy, culminating with membership in Kennedy's presidential cam-
paign think tank.91 Kennedy's election led to Cox's appointment as 
Solicitor General, a position where he distinguished himself and 
established or cemented many of the Washington ties that would be 
important in his subsequent role in the nation's capita1.92 
Watergate, of course, to which I will return shortly, is the high 
point of Gormley's account. Even so, Gormley presents an engaging 
portrait of Cox's life after Watergate, in which he continued as a 
productive teacher and scholar as well as a somewhat important 
actor in national affairs through the chairmanship of Common 
Cause.93 One might hesitate to describe Cox as a major, front-line 
player in the post-Watergate world of public policy concerning cor-
ruption, government ethics, and the institutions to combat them. 
87. See id. at 3. 
88. See, e.g., id. at 45. Gormley describes a conversation in which Judge 
Learned Hand appeared to express admiration for Cox's cousin Harry Tweed. See 
id. Gormley continues as follows: 
Harrison Tweed was one of the many grandchildren of William Maxwell 
Evarts and a successful lawyer in the prestigious New York firm of 
Millbank Tweed. He was a high-profile attorney known for his frequent 
detours into public service. From bits and pieces of conversations, Archie 
soon figured out why Learned Hand wanted to be his cousin Harry 
Tweed. Tweed was "the polo player, the handsome young man at whose 
feet every young woman fell in New York City and on Long Island, the 
prominent figure in the Porcellian Club [at Harvardl." 
[d. at 45 (footnote omitted). 
89. See id. at 38-39. 
90. See id. at 79-94 (discussing Cox's return to Harvard after a brief stint as 
Chair of President Truman's Wage Stabilization Board). 
91. See id. at 124-39 (outlining his movement from "tag-along" at strategy 
conferences to his contribution as a member of the Kennedy brain trust and ef-
forts as a speech writer for Kennedy). 
92. See id. at 140-95. 
93. See id. at 414-19 (describing the rise of Common Cause, a citizen group 
founded to make government more accountable to the 'public). 
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There is an intriguing element of disengagement, despite continued 
participation, almost as if Cox had made his greatest contribution in 
1973 and could never do anything in that arena to surpass it. 
As for Watergate, Cox advanced from a dark horse, at best, to 
Attorney General Elliot Richardson's prime candidate for the new 
position of special prosecutor to investigate that scandal.94 It was 
clear that Richardson's own nomination hung in the balance and that 
he had to pick a suitable special prosecutor in order to satisfy the 
Senate Judiciary Committee as well as the full Senate.95 Particular-
ly interesting are the negotiations between Cox and Richardson over 
the breadth of the former's charter.96 Cox was astute enough to real-
ize that, beyond independence, he needed wide jurisdiction over mat-
ters that perhaps were not foreseen at the time of his appointment 
but could lead to resolving the ultimate question of a cover-up by 
implicating the ultimate public official. 
As previously alluded to, Cox staffed his office with a lean and 
mean team of "hungry young prosecutors ... famished for action."97 
It is hard to come away from Gormley's account without a distinct 
impression of intense partisanship in the initial establishment and 
ongoing functioning of the office. Gormley tells us that "[t]wo col-
leagues from Harvard Law School, James Vorenberg and Philip 
Heymann, volunteered to give up their summers to help Cox estab-
lish his office."98 Both Vorenberg and Heymann have held key posi-
tions in Democratic administrations, the latter as recently as the 
early days of Janet Reno's tenure as Attorney General. Gormley 
makes no effort to hide this dimension of the enterprise. For exam-
ple, he quotes an admission of Heymann that "Nixon was a major 
villain to the crowd of liberal Democrats that Archie associated with 
in Washington and Cambridge.,,99 Gormley, however, strains to por-
tray the office as not really partisan, citing the presence of a number 
of token Republicans and the fact that, in Washington, many per-
sons, particularly lawyers, have ties with both political parties. loo 
94. See id . . at 232 (discussing initial call from Richardson offering the Special 
Prosecutor position to Cox). 
95. See id. at 233, 240-42 (expressing the importance of Richardson's decision 
and the initial approval of Cox). It is interesting to note that one of the rejected 
early front-runners was Lawrence Walsh. See id. at 234. One Richardson aide was 
quoted as follows: "It was the old Yankee[sl .... There's a lot to be said against 
the tribe of New England Protestants who populated the Northeast. But there's a 
lot to be said about the old-boy network of trust." Id. at 236 (footnote omitted). 
96. See id. at 238-39. 
97. Id. at 264 (footnote omitted). 
98. Id. at 249. 
99. Id. at 250. 
100. See id. at 266 (stating that many individuals involved in Watergate inter-
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This reader was not convinced. 
In a way, it is hardly surprising that the ambitious group of the 
best and brightest who flocked to Cox's banner were largely Demo-
crats. The country was in the second term of a Republican adminis-
tration. One suspects that most Republican lawyers with an interest 
in government and politics were either already in the administration 
or not inclined to join an enterprise that seemed bent on attacking it. 
The hungry young lawyers who "wanted a taste of Washington ac-
tion"IOI knew full well what they were getting into. Indeed, the 
specter of partisanship, perhaps inevitable given Cox's involvement 
in Kennedy political campaigns, was indelibly present from the out-
set after a swearing-in ceremony attended by many "high-profile 
Democrats," including members of the Kennedy family.lo2 
The aura of partisanship surrounding his office inevitably raised 
the question of whether Cox was to some extent "out to get" Presi-
dent Nixon. It requires little stretch of the imagination to reach that 
conclusion with respect to many of the lawyers, but what about the 
boss? At one point, Gormley discusses Cox's early thinking as includ-
ing a hope that the president would not be found guilty of any 
wrongdoing during the special prosecutor's investigation. lo3 On the 
other hand, Gormley himself states that "Cox probably would not 
have come to Washington were it not for the issue of whether the 
president himself had been involved in the Watergate cover-up."I04 
In the same vein he quotes Cox's deputy, Hank Ruth, as saying, "It 
is clear to me that Archie's principal reason to be there was to dis-
cover if the president of the United States had committed a crime. If 
it was only the other issues . . . my guess is that he wouldn't have 
come."I05 
From a lawyer's perspective, one of the most fascinating aspects of 
this part of the Cox story is how he handled three extremely difficult 
sets of interactions between his office and other institutions. Particu-
larly problematic for the newly-minted special prosecutor was man-
aging relations with the Senate Watergate Committee. Gormley's 
detailed discussion of these relations leaves one with the impression 
that neither side ever worked the matter out in a satisfactory man-
ner, and that had the Cox endeavor persisted, friction would have 
impeded operations on both sides. 106 
acted with both political parties). 
101. [d. at 262. 
102. See id. at 245-46. 
103. See id. at 251 ("I do know that 1 was not anxious to find Richard Nixon 
was responsible for the break-in, for a cover-up, or for any other wrongdoing."). 
104. [d. at 265. 
105. [d. 
106. See, e.g., id. at 269-74 (discussing initial conflicts and litigation between 
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Equally intriguing is the question of relations between the new 
office and the existing team of assistant attorney generals who were 
already handling the Watergate matter, treating it primarily "as a 
straightforward burglary case.,,107 It has been suggested that these 
relations were relatively amicable,108 but Gormley paints a distinct-
ly different picture. Cox and his team seem to have felt that they 
needed the prosecutors for the short run but had to move them aside 
in order to progress beyond the burglary issue to that of the cover-up 
and the ultimate question of presidential involvement. Once again, 
Professor Heymann is candid in his explanation that "[n]one of us 
were prosecutors. It was clear we had to keep the U.S. attorney peo-
ple doing their work . . . . I felt we had to string them along for a 
while. And then ... get rid of them.,,109 Ultimately, the unhappy 
union could not last and Cox requested that the three prosecutors 
withdraw from the case. This resolution obviously led to mixed emo-
tions on the part of individuals who felt that they had essentially 
resolved the matter but were being denied vindication. Gormley 
makes it clear that the special prosecutor and his team derived bene-
fit from the work of their predecessors, but felt strongly that only 
their office could assert the independence necessary to do the job. As 
Gormley describes the end result, "[T]he U.S. attorney's office was 
now purged from the Watergate prosecution, for good."uO 
Fundamental, of course, were relations between the special 
prosecutor's office and the White House itself. Gormley paints a grip-
ping picture of what might have been as the two sides came tenuous-
ly close to an agreement over the White House tapes. Ultimately, 
negotiations broke down, resulting in litigation and resignation. lll 
With respect to Cox's own departure, Gormley gives us the Saturday 
Night Massacre in all its gory detail, primarily from an inside per-
spective. Particularly compelling is the account of Cox's dramatic 
press conference and the growing recognition by the President and 
those around him of its effect on the nation. 112 
After Watergate, Cox's rich "semiretirement" included involvement 
with the 1976 presidential candidacy of Maurice K. Udall, his close 
the office and the Committee). 
107. [d. at 256. 
108. See, e.g., HARRIGER, supra note 16, at 23 (stating that there was a "signifi-
cant amount of interaction between the two offices" of the Watergate Special Pros-
ecutor and the Department of Justice). 
109. GoRMLEY, supra note 2, at 256 (footnote omitted). 
110. [d. at 281. 
111. See id. at 290-313 (describing the battle over the White House tapes be-
tween the Special Prosecutor and the White House). 
112. See id. at 350-54. 
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shot at a seat on the First Circuit Court of Appeals, his work as a 
Supreme Court advocate, and his involvement with Common 
Cause.U3 In a fascinating "Epilogue," Cox shares his current 
thoughts on the Office of Independent Counsel, as well as some 
broader reflections. u4 With respect to the semipermanent Office of 
Independent Counsel, Professor Cox continues to express support 
with some qualifications. u5 He feels that it is important to have 
such a mechanism in place for those rare occasions, such as Water-
gate, when the normal machinery is either incapable of doing the job, 
or is widely perceived as such. 116 Cox recognizes the possible "run-
away application" of the statute, and offers the perception that the 
mandate is too large and that jurisdiction should largely be limited 
to "an abuse of power while in the White House.,,1l7 He is also con-
cerned with the problems created by part-time independent counsels, 
and seeks a greater emphasis on "public exoneration of the innocent" 
as well as the prosecutor's natural inclination to indict the guilty.u8 
Despite these flaws, "Cox still believed in the importance of the inde-
pendent-counsel law. 'The simple fact is that one cannot count on the 
Department of Justice to carry out a vigorous, fair, and publicly 
credible investigation of senior members of the same administra-
tion .... It just isn't the way the world works, unfortunately.",u9 
Watergate was perhaps sui generis, but it had a lasting impact on 
the American political process. Part of that impact was a desire to 
never see a repetition of such a crisis; the new institutional mecha-
nism of the independent counsel reflected this desire. As Professor 
O'Sullivan puts it, "The Watergate scandal-and the crisis in public 
confidence in government it spawned-left us many legacies, one of 
which is the Independent Counsel. . . statute."120 The creation of 
the independent counsel mechanism, however, did not immediately 
follow the Saturday Night Massacre. It took almost five years for the 
political process to institutionalize what Archibald Cox had pio-
neered. 121 It may be that even those who thought he was right over-
113. See id. at 393-422. 
114. See id. at 431-33 (explaining Cox's belief in the necessity of independent 
counsel investigations of wrongdoing in the executive branch). . 
115. See id. (expressing concern over "runaway application" of the statute while 
supporting its retention with changes). 
116. See id. at 433. 
117. Id. at 432. 
118. See id. at 433 (footnote omitted). 
119. Id. at 432-33 (footnote omitted). 
120. O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 463 (footnote omitted). 
121. For an excellent account of these developments, see HARRIGER, supra note 
16, at 40-72. Also, there have been previous special prosecutors in American histo-
ry, including during Teapot Dome and the Tax Scandals of the 1950s. See id. at 
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all were concerned about the awesome power that Cox had shown 
such an office was capable of wielding. Indeed, the congressional 
debates immediately post-Watergate reveal a striking similarity to 
today's concerns. One example among many is testimony by then 
Attorney General Edward Levi concerning a 1976 proposal for tempo-
rary special prosecutors. In addition to constitutional concerns, 
He pointed to the damage to reputation that could occur due to the 
lack of safeguards for confidentiality of the attorney general's report 
and to the possibility of multiple special prosecutors at any given 
time. Levi suggested that the proliferation of special prosecutors, 
each with only one case and independent of the department, would 
enhance rather than reduce "the likelihood of unequal justice."122 
In the end, of course, the special prosecutor mechanism took per-
manent institutional form in the guise of the independent counsel. 
Even here, Congress showed reservations by requiring periodic re-
authorization of the statute. 
Thus, one might say that Special Prosecutor Cox's overall legacy 
was creating a sense of need for such a mechanism, plus wariness on 
all sides about what it could do. Gormley's account suggests that 
Professor Cox did not playas significant a role in the creation of the 
independent counsel as did other contemporaneous participants such 
as Samuel Dash. 123 The Cox biography does, however, yield a num-
ber of insights that are relevant to today's debate. The first is that 
the work of a special prosecutor is likely to be of a high profile na-
ture with a distinct risk of partisanship. Both of these features are 
greatly accentuated when the president himself is potentially in-
volved. Beyond questions of partisanship, one cannot escape the fact 
that any special prosecutor will.be a participant in, rather than an 
alternative to, the political process. Like his successors, Cox had to 
interact with the Congress/24 the Department of Justice,t25 and a 
range of executive branch officials. 126 Even during his brief tenure, 
questions of cost and mandate surfaced. 127 Cox was anxious to have 
13-16. 
122. Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).-
123. See HARRIGER, supra note 16, at 58 (discussing Dash's influence on the 
legislative process). 
124. See GoRMLEY, supra note 2, at 286-87 (recounting negotiations with Sena-
tor Ervin over release of Watergate tapes). 
125. See id. at 254-55 (recounting the initial meeting between Cox and Depart-
ment of Justice attorneys from the Criminal Division). 
126. See id. at 323-27 (discussing meetings between Cox and the White House 
over the "Stennis comprOlnise"). 
127. See id. at 296-97 (noting White House concern that Cox would investigate 
all aspects of the Nixon presidency for an indefinite period of time). 
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a broad range of jurisdiction, feeling that one could not know at the 
outset just how far the investigation might lead.128 At one point, 
according to Gormley, the team was "simultaneously investigating 
Watergate, the ITT matter, illegal campaign financing, political sabo-
tage and espionage ('dirty tricks'), and the increasingly bizarre activi-
ties of the special White House investigations unit known as the 
'plumbers.",129 As for cost, "Cox and Vornberg settled on a $2.8 mil-
lion budget, more money than they could ever need (they agreed) to 
prosecute one case.,,130 Overall, it is clear from Gormley's thorough 
treatment of the subject that many of the problems of today's inde-
pendent counsel were foreshadowed during the brief existence of the 
Watergate Special Prosecution Force. To appreciate the extent to 
which the (I:ecent) past is prologue, it is still necessary to examine in 
detail the operations of a major independent counsel operation under 
the current statute. 
B. Lawrence Walsh-A Major Investigation and its Limits 
Lawrence Walsh's Firewall is the product of an experienced public 
servant and practitioner who knows that he is a lightning rod, in-
deed a villain, for many people. l3l Walsh's tenure as independent 
counsel investigating the Iran-Contra matter led to sustained criti-
cism of the current mechanism across a wide array of political and 
intellectual circles. 132 He was appointed to investigate the conver-
gence of two serious matters involving national security and foreign 
policy: the covert sale of arms to Iran and the diversion of substan-
tial funds from those sales to the Nicaraguan Contras.133 Because of 
the possible presidential involvement and the constitutional issues 
involved, Walsh clearly felt that there was a strong kinship between 
his mission and that of Archibald Cox thirteen years earlier.134 Cer-
tainly the parallels between the two operations are abundant. For 
example, Walsh tells us, "There was no shortage of eager applicants. 
128. See id. at 238 (noting Cox's desire for broad investigative authority given 
the complexities of Watergate). 
129. [d. at 305. 
130. [d. at 254. 
131. See WALSH, supra note 12, at 282-83 (noting that his decision to proceed 
with the remand hearing in the Oliver North case led to statements that he was 
not reasonable, "a vindictive wretch," and proceeding at unnecessary taxpayer 
expense). 
132. See, e.g., GARMENT, supra note 11, at 210-22. 
133. See WALSH, supra note 12, at 3-15 (giving Walsh's synopsis of key events 
in Iran-Contra). 
134. See id. at 57 ("The scope of our assignment, like Watergate ... necessitat-
ed a new government mini-agency ... . n). 
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A high-profile Washington investigation could make the reputation of 
a young lawyer.'>l35 As with Cox's operation, accusations of parti-
sanship colored the operation. l36 Like Cox, Walsh wanted "broad 
investigative authority" from the outset. l37 Perhaps even more than 
his illustrious predecessor, Walsh felt all along that the President, in 
this case Ronald Reagan, "was within range of impeachment."l38 
Walsh's account is a fascinating look at the inner workings of the 
independent counsel's office dealing with complex matters at the 
highest levels of the federal government. I wish to note at the outset, 
however, an aspect of Walsh's account, part stylistic, part substan-
tive, that raises troubling questions about his approach to the entire 
enterprise. This aspect can almost be called an "enemies list mentali-
ty." At times it is primarily stylistic. Here is how he describes an 
opposing lawyer: 
The General Counsel to the National Security Agency, Elizabeth 
Rindskopf, was tough. An attorney trained as an advocate for 
plaintiffs' class actions, she seemed to us not easily deterred by 
facts, reason, or appeals to fairness. Her concern was not only the 
preservation of intelligence sources, but also the protection of her 
agency from embarrassment. She exaggerated claims of national 
security risks so grossly that I wondered whether she was bucking 
for a White House appointment. (After George Bush became presi-
dent, Rindskopf was promoted to succeed Russell Bruemmer as 
General Counsel of the CIA.).139 
One might say that this is simply an example of Walsh wielding a 
sharp pen, which he certainly does, it should be noted, on a gender-
equal basis. Thus, at one point, Walsh describes Robert Bennett (yes, 
that Robert Bennett, who was defending Casper Weinberger) as 
"sprawled at the back corner of his counsel table, his girth protrud-
ing through his open coat and both arms extended along the rail that 
separated the well of the court from the spectators-a possessive 
posture that reminded me of the nineteenth century Thomas Nast 
cartoons of Boss Tweed."l40 At times, Judge Walsh's pen seems 
dipped in stronger stuff than ink, and style tends toward ideology. 
Consider the following discussion of the Federalist Society, which I 
quote in its entirety: 
135. Id. at 29. 
136. See, e.g., id. at 470 (discussing Republican attacks on Walsh's investigation 
on the ground that "Democratic activist lawyers" were on Walsh's stafl). 
137. See id. at 26 (noting Walsh's insistence on broad investigatory powers for 
the independent counsel before he accepted the position). . 
138. Id. at 3. 
139. Id. at 176. 
140. Id. at 437. 
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But I was concerned about the continuing political allegiance of Re-
publican judges as manifested in the Federalist Society. Although 
the organization was not openly partisan, its dogma was political. It 
reminded me of the communist front groups of the 1940s and 1950s, 
whose members were committed to the communist cause and subject 
to communist direction, but were not card-carrying members of the 
Communist Party. In calling for the narrow construction of constitu-
tional grants of governmental power, the Federalist Society seemed 
to speak for right wing Republicans. I was especially troubled that 
one of White House Counsel Boyden Gray's assistants had openly 
declared that no one who was not a member of the Federalist Soci-
ety had received a judicial appointment from President Bush.141 
When he discusses those who created problems for his investiga-
tion, Judge Walsh's ideology in the form of partisanship, despite his 
professed Republicanism, reaches troubling levels. On this point I do 
not simply refer to his treatment of the subjects and their lawyers. 
One would expect the opposing lawyers to try all means to block the 
probe and would also expect Walsh to be critical of their tactics, 
which he indeed is, as in his accusation of the use of media manipu-
lation by Robert Bennett and Lloyd Cutler.142 What I find particu-
larly troubling is Walsh's attack on the federal judiciary, at least 
those members who might have or did rule against him. Walsh tells 
us that when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit struck down the Independent Counsel Act as unconstitutional, it 
was "led by Judge Laurence H. Silberman, a hard-line Reagan loyal-
ist."143 At another point, Walsh informs us that 
[T]he final evaluation of the immunity that Congress had granted 
Oliver North and John Poindexter would be the work of yet another 
political force-a force cloaked in the black robes of those dedicated 
to defining and preserving the rule of law. Although the judiciary is 
theoretically a neutral arm of government and judges are expected 
to eschew partisan politics, the underlying political nature of all 
government institutions was evident when a three-judge panel from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reviewed Oliver North's conviction in 1990.144 
Also disturbing is his comparison of Federal District Judge Thomas 
F. Hogan with the Tammany judges of New York. 145 
141. [d. at 248. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I have 
been a member of the Society since its inception. 
142. See id. at 413-15 (discussing press leaks by Bennett, Cutler, and others). 
143. [d. at 70. 
144. [d. at 247. 
145. See id. at 438 (suggesting Judge Hogan's treatment of Robert Bennett, 
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The same willingness to impugn motive surfaces with a vengeance 
when it comes to congressional critics of the Iran-Contra Independent 
Counsel's work. Let me elaborate on my earlier reference to Judge 
Walsh's vendetta against former Senate Minority Leader Robert 
Dole. Walsh describes Dole as "sinister."146 Walsh does not hesitate 
to compare him to Senator Joseph McCarthy, referring to the latter 
as "Dole's mean-minded model.,,147 We learn that "[w]ith a sardonic 
ruthlessness reminiscent of Joseph McCarthy, Dole hurled a continu-
ous barrage of unsubstantiated charges at US.,,148 The gist of Judge 
Walsh's complaint is that Dole's specific criticism of the indictment of 
Casper Weinberger, as well as his more general criticism ofthe inde-
pendent counsel's office, constituted an "instance of a U.S. senator's 
trying to influence the disposition of a pending case.,,149 Thus, 
Walsh wonders "how any lawyer who had used his Senate office to 
interfere in a case pending in the courts could be so blind to his own 
contempt while accusing others of it.,,150 The former independent 
counsel seems to view Senator Dole's ongoing criticism of his office as 
not merely "partisan attacks," but "misconduct" which amounts to 
"the derogation of the rule of law.,,151 
On at least one matter, it appears Senator Dole had a better un-
derstanding of the law than the independent counsel. He wrote to 
Walsh asking for a list of employees of the office during the past six 
years at a time when the partisanship of James Brosnahan, a key 
staffer, had become a major issue. 152 Walsh declined to furnish the 
information, labeling the request "inappropriate," and informing the 
Senator that "[y]our public charges of political motivation for deci-
sions of this office consistently appear to be without foundation, but 
they constitute an intrusion into pending court proceedings.,,153 
Walsh mayor may not have regarded the operations of his public-
ly-funded office as secret, but he seems to have been unaware of the 
bearing of the Freedom of Information Act on Senator Dole's request. 
The controversy was resolved as follows: 
with whom the Judge was familiar, was similar to the treatment afforded by 
Tammany judges); id. at 443 (suggesting comparison between "the way cases were 
fixed in Washington" and "Tammany Hall in its heyday"). 
146. See id. at 417. 
147. [d. at 529. 
148. [d. at 470. 
149. [d. at 468. 
150. [d. at 509. 
151. [d. at 530. 
152. See id. at 478-81 (detailing Senator Dole's attack on Brosnahan for being a 
partisan). 
153. [d. at 481. 
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[A] few days later, after experts on the Freedom of Information Act 
convinced me that any person was entitled to know who my employ-
ees were, I gave Dole the list that he had asked for. In response to a. 
further request from Dole, I sent him a list that showed my 
employees' titles and their dates of employment. 164 
Although Senator Dole is the principal recipient of this treatment, 
he is by no means the only one. Senator Orrin Hatch is described as 
a "[slee-no-evil conservative,"155 although Walsh later softens the 
blow by stating that "Hatch didn't seem venal, but he certainly was 
blind; from the beginning, he had seen no crime by anyone-not even 
Oliver North.,,156 Walsh even makes a contemptuous reference to 
highly-respected former Senator Warren Rudman.157 
I have dwelt on Walsh's propensity to denigrate critics at some 
length because I believe it tells us a lot about Walsh's approach to 
the job: He held the moral high ground. Anyone who opposed him 
was at best a partisan, at worst, a subverter of the rule of law. Of 
course, the stakes were high. Some Republicans were motivated 
primarily by a desire to protect two administrations of their own 
party. This particular dimension and Walsh's highlighting of it, how-
ever, should not obscure the fact that his investigation was a major 
example of an independent counsel's work being extensively criticized 
for its high cost, long duration and seemingly meager results. 15S In-
deed, in 1992, Republicans, although in the minority, succeeded in 
temporarily blocking renewal of the independent counsel statute, 
based on their displeasure with Walsh.159 Assuming some merit to 
154. Id. Walsh felt vindicated when he learned from members of the press that 
Robert Lighthizer, a former key aide to Dole, was a partner of Robert Bennett 
and that there were other connections between Bennett's firm and the Senator's 
office: "To me, this epitomized Dole's hypocrisy in his professed concern about 
Brosnahan's contributions before he joined my office." Id. at 483. 
155. Id. at 67. 
156. Id. at 417. 
157. See id. at 90 (attributing Senator Rudman's attempt to force Walsh to 
"prosecute North for destroying documents" as motivated by political concerns for 
both Reagan and Bush). 
158. See Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Foreword to Judicial Conference, 
supra note 1, at 1523 tbl. (listing Walsh's investigation as costing $47.4 million 
with a result of seven guilty pleas, four convictions of which two were overturned 
on appeal, and six Presidential pardons); O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 502-03 
(comparing the Walsh investigation-which cost approximately $40 million for the 
investigation and nearly $60 million more for "the cost to government agencies of 
complying with the document requests and subpoenas issued by his office," and 
resulted in "indictment of fourteen persons,"-with the $39 million and $39.8 mil-
lion budgets of two United States Attorneys' offices that handled a total of 8,000 
criminal and civil cases). 
159. See WALSH, supra note 12, at 439 (recounting a Republican Senate filihus-
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both sides' arguments, a crucial question about Walsh's story emerg-
es: how successfully does he justify his efforts and explain why they' 
did not lead further. 
As Walsh saw the matter, President Reagan had violated both the 
National Security Act and the Arms Export Control law; and North 
had "usurped Congress's constitutional authority over government 
appropriations."16o Moreover, their associates at high, medium and 
lower levels had aided and abetted these central wrongs.16l Walsh 
describes in detail his tactic of attempting to "flip" or "roll over" peo-
ple in the latter two categories: "Our immediate goal was to indict 
and convict a guilty person who might turn into a valuable witness 
in the hope of receiving a lenient sentence."162 An important theme 
in this attempt is the use of relatively minor offenses, like making 
false statements, in order to get the subordinates to plead guilty or 
to secure their conviction. Walsh did achieve a measure of success in 
this endeavor with initial convictions of John Poindexter,163 Claire 
George/64 and Oliver North. 165 Elliott Abrams and Alan Fiers 
agreed to plead guilty to relatively minor offenses.166 Of course 
some convictions were reversed. 167 Walsh makes a strong argument 
that it is necessary to use this prosecutorial technique, and that the 
independent counsel requires the availability of crimes such as ob-
structing congressional investigations, making false statements, and 
peIjury/68 to lay the groundwork for getting to those in charge of 
the criminal enterprise. 
The question remains why he could not successfully take this 
second step. Walsh's contention is that the "Firewall" stopped him. 
By "Firewall" he means everything from the withholding of docu-
ter threat led by Senator Dole). 
160. WALSH, supra note 12, at 13. 
161. See id. at 1-15 (summarizing Walsh's view of the activities of the officials 
involved in the Iran-Contra affair). 
162. [d. at 74. 
163. See id. at 246 (noting John Poindexter was convicted on all counts). 
164. See id. at 446 (noting George's conviction "of two felony counts of lying to 
Congress" and acquittal on five other charges). 
165. See id. at 206 (noting North's conviction on three counts and acquittal on 
nine other charges). 
166. See id. at 309 (Abrams "pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of with-
holding information from Congress"); id. at 286 (Fiers pled guilty "to two misde-
meanor charges of withholding information from Congress"). 
167. See id. at 310 (reversal of Poindexter's conviction); id. at 256 (reversal of 
North's conviction). 
168. See, e.g., id. at 415 (stating that the Weinberger indictment consisted of 
"five felonies, including one count of obstructing a congressional investigation, two 
counts of making false statements, and two charges of perjury"). 
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ments,169 and a variety of similar delaying tactics, to outright con-
cealment,170 and the ultimate exercise of executive power-the pres-
idential pardon. l7l Walsh directs particular vehemence at the par-
don of Casper Weinberger.172 The following excerpt is a good exam-
ple of the "Firewall" that Walsh feels he faced: 
The basic cause for our failure to proceed further against Meese had 
been the delay in the production of notes. Perhaps more than any 
other single failure, it drove home to me some of the major mistakes 
I had made: my initial underestimation of the scope of my job; my 
consistent understaffing; my reliance on document requests rather 
than subpoenas; and my drastic narrowing of our early investigation 
in an unsuccessful effort to escape the consequences of the congres-
sional grants of immunity to Poindexter and North. While making 
my task infinitely more difficult, the cover-up had saved its chief 
architect from suffering the fate of President Nixon's attorney gener-
al John Mitchell and following further in his footsteps-perhaps all 
the way to prison. 173 
That excerpt captures the range of Walsh's assessment, including 
his candid acknowledgment of mistakes on his own part. Still, one 
comes away with the distinct impression that no independent counsel 
could have succeeded in breaching the "Firewall." Walsh is particu-
larly critical of the Weinberger pardon and, despite protests to the 
contrary, seems to recognize as a form of poetic justice that the 
Weinberger indictment had played a role in George Bush's re-election 
defeat in 1992. He even quotes President-elect Clinton on the pardon 
to the effect that "1 am concerned about any action ... which sends a 
signal that if you work for the government, you are above the law, or 
that not telling the truth to Congress under oath is somehow less 
serious than not telling the truth to some other body under oath.,,174 
Whether or not one agrees with Walsh's laying of the major share of 
blame on the Reagan-Bush administrations, it is hard to argue with 
his contention that powerful people did and will thwart investiga-
tions of themselves, especially if prosecution, disgrace, or even im-
169. See, e.g., id. at 502 (discussing Weinberger's withholding of his notes from 
Walsh for five years). 
170. See, e.g., id. (accusing Weinberger of lying to Congress, the Congressional 
Counsel, and to Walsh's office). 
171. See id. at 490-92 (discussing previous pardons and initial reactions to those 
by Bush). 
172. See id. at 504-08 (detailing the negative reaction to the Weinberger par-
don). One of the critics was constitutional scholar Professor Laurence Tribe of the 
Harvard Law School. See id. at 507-08. 
173. [d. at 386. 
174. [d. at 493. 
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peachment are likely results.175 Certainly, if a determined, experi-
enced independent counsel such as Walsh could not proceed further, 
it is highly unlikely that an attorney general under the control of the 
president could have gotten as far. Thus, it is not surprising that 
Walsh concludes with a qualified endorsement of retaining the stat-
ute, perhaps with some changes. 176 
What, then, are the broader lessons about the future of the statute 
and its desirability that we can draw from this remarkably candid 
account with its almost larger-than-life virtues and flaws? One, as 
with Watergate, is that interaction with the White House will always 
be difficult when the president is a potential target. Walsh argues 
persuasively that Watergate was not unique in this respect. 177 In-
deed, he paints the independent counsel as somewhat the weaker 
party in a high-stakes Washington confrontation.178 It seems also 
clear that Congress's role will remain central, particularly if it is 
simultaneously investigating the same matters. The highly visible 
role of individual members as critics or defenders of the independent 
counsel-perhaps both as circumstances change-is certainly likely 
to continue. Walsh notes that Senator Carl Levin defended the 
length and time of his investigation because the subjects had sought 
to block and delay it,179 although Levin appears critical of Indepen-
dent Counsel Kenneth Starr. ISO Walsh recognizes the charge that 
his work was an example of criminalizing the political process, but 
does not seem to accept it. lSI He also remains a staunch defender of 
independent counsel reports, while recognizing that they may be con-
troversial. ls2 As for the notion that ordinary prosecutorial practices 
175. See id. at 509 (noting Senator Carl Levin's statement that "powerful indi-
viduals had 'helped to thwart the investigation of themselves'"). 
176. See id. at 526-28 (suggesting a "public interest" standard in appointing an 
independent counsel, adding restraints to prevent abuse by an independent coun-
sel, but opposing any requirement that the independent counsel relocate to Wash-
ington, D.C., during the investigation). 
177. See id. at 22 (stating that he never expected the White House to cooperate 
with his investigation). 
178. See id. at 32 (stating that his office lacked veterans of capital politics and 
even used makeshift office space: "I had none of the standard ingredients of politi-
cal capital in Washington .... "). 
179. See id. at 509 (reporting Levin statement that those who had "helped to 
thwart the investigation" now complain about the long delay). 
180. See Neil A. Lewis, Tripping Over the Ghosts of Watergate, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 1998, § 4, at 1 (noting Levin's criticism of the tendency to expand inves-
tigations and use of the independent counsel to investigate conduct prior to as-
sumption of office). 
181. See WALSH, supra note 12, at 267 (reporting Schultz's critique that Walsh 
was attempting to criminalize the political process); id. at 494 (noting Bush's 
statement that Walsh's investigation was "politically inspired"). 
182. See id. at 527-28 (arguing that independent counsel's interim reports are 
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would have led to acceptable results, Walsh dismisses them out of 
hand, noting the inevitable bias of the Justice Department.183 In 
sum, one might conclude, as Professor Harriger recently noted,184 
that the arguments are likely to repeat themselves. In this. sense, 
Walsh's Firewall may not change anyone's mind, but it will certainly 
serve to reinforce existing positions about the independent counsel. 
As a final observation, I was struck by the recurrence throughout 
Walsh's account of an issue that has emerged in current debates over 
the independent counsel: What should be the relationship between 
that office and the press? In Walsh's case, the press turns out to 
have been one of his key backers-a source of strength and informa-
tion. He was careful to cultivate and maintain relations with what he 
refers to as the "mainstream" press. 185 In this capacity, Nina 
Totenberg of National Public Radio made frequent appearances, even 
calling Judge Walsh at home to report to him on how an oral argu-
ment had gone.186 Walsh found frequent support in the columns of 
Anthony Lewis of the New York Times, who in recent years has been 
anything but a supporter of the Independent Counsel.187 For exam-
ple, in discussing the Weinberger matter, Lewis wrote as follows: 
"George Bush's falsehoods have none of the justifications sometimes 
offered for lying. They are not white lies, to save hurt feelings. They 
are not lies to serve some great cause. They are only lies, small and 
large, to serve George Bush's ambition .... They show us a man 
without the inner values that restrain human conduct: a man with-
out a core."188 
While Walsh describes his practice of giving weekly interviews and 
refers to the reporters as his "principal constituency,"189 he makes a 
distinction between the mainstream press and other news organi-
the counsel's "most effective defense against political intrusion and attack"). 
183. See id. at 429, 486 (noting opposition to statute by President Bush's Attor-
ney General William Barr). 
184. See Harriger, supra note 16; at 490 (arguing "that the issues at the center 
of the debate about the provisions today were there from the start"). 
185. See WALSH, supra note 12, at 263 (expressing his hope-following reversal 
of North's conviction-that the news media would support his quest to expand the 
inv~stigation). 
186. See id. at 251 (noting that Totenberg had been the first to telephone him 
following the appellate court oral argument in the North case). 
187. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, After Kenneth Starr, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at 
A23 (arguing that the independent counsel statute, with its unlimited funds, 
should be replaced by a professional and "largely independent" professional integri-
ty office within the Department of Justice). 
188. WALSH, supra note 12, at 461; see also id. at 95 (quoting Lewis's column 
apparently expressing approval of Walsh's use of "standard prosecutorial strategy"). 
189. See id. at 163. 
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zations such as the Washington Times and the Wall Street Jour-
nal. 190 Thus, this independent counsel had his own sense of public 
relations. To some degree it worked, although my sense of the litera-
ture is that the overall reaction to Walsh's extensive effort is more 
negative than positive. 191 I do not think that one can fault him for 
reaching out to the press and naturally being grateful to those mem-
bers who supported his efforts. The question of how any independent 
counsel interacts with the media remains an important one, especial-
ly if he is up against the heavy artillery of the White House spin 
machine and its allies. In this respect, it is essential to recognize 
that there is almost certain to be a high degree of public interest in 
an independent counsel investigation of a major political figure. It is 
precisely the phenomenon of public attention, specifically negative 
public attention, that Peter Morgan and Glenn Reynolds address in 
The Appearance of Impropriety. They are not only talking about the 
practices of a particular prosecutor or ethics enforcement official, but 
what they see as an overall frenzy concerning political wrongdoing in 
the post-Watergate years. 
C. The Appearance of Impropriety-The Counterrevolution in Gov-
ernment Ethics and its Possible Impact on the Independent 
Counsel Debate 
The thesis presented in The Appearance of Impropriety by Peter 
Morgan and Glenn Reynolds192 becomes more significant as the re-
newal debate continues to grow in intensity. For that reason I focus 
on this work to the same degree as the two previously discussed 
volumes that deal directly with the functioning of an independent 
counsel (or special prosecutor's) office, although only approximately 
15 of the book's 233 pages pertain to the independent counsel. 
The Appearance of Impropriety is a useful, concise statement of the 
themes of the counterrevolution in government ethics which forms a 
major component of the intellectual background of that particular 
debate. The authors' thesis is that we have reached a point in ethics 
190. See id. at 440 (noting a false story that Walsh and Craig Gillen were 
guilty of "tax evasion" and of a felony, unfounded allegations that formed the basis 
of a Wall Street Journal editorial); id. at 475 (noting that media support of Dole's 
attacks came only from the "unabashedly biased" Washington Times). 
191. Compare O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 474 (arguing that the words "Law-
rence Walsh" refute any argument that an investigation will be "above politics" if 
a "nonpartisan figure of great repute" is appointed), with HARRIGER, supra note 16, 
at 203-04 (arguing that Congress's· competing interest with Walsh hampered the 
investigation). 
192. MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13. 
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enforcement where "the costs of vigilance outweigh the benefits."193 
They present a picture of overkill, based in part on an emphasis on 
"appearances." Morgan and Reynolds see this amorphous standard 
applied to an extraordinary range of conduct in political and other 
sectors. They argue that "[h]ardly anyone seems able to evaluate the 
rightness or wrongness of conduct these days without gravely consid-
ering how it appears.,,194 Along with this hopelessly broad standard 
has come an excessive recourse to the criminal law, leading to a 
situation where ''by so expanding the universe of federal crimes, we 
have dissipated one of our most precious resources for moral instruc-
tion.,,195 Along with stringent standards has come the development 
of an entrenched mechanism of enforcement. 
Worse yet, the process of "reform" has had as its chief result the 
creation of an "ethics establishment" that itself possesses an active 
interest in keeping the flames of scandal burning even while solicit-
ing funds to fight the fire. The growth of this establishment has 
caused appearance ethics, and its accompanying vices, to metasta-
size well beyond the political field, infiltrating many other aspects of 
society, from science, to academia, to the business world. 196 
The authors see these developments as producing something akin 
to self-fulfilJing prophecies. Since virtually everything is a scandal, it 
is hard to apply a meaningful judgment that labels particular con-
duct scandalous. 197 Furthermore, those subject to the ethics rules 
have decreasing respect for them, and thus try to skirt them or en-
gage in paper compliance.19s Perhaps the most serious consequence 
is the loss of the public's trust in public servants, given the fact that 
a wide range of the latter are constantly under investigation. 199 
The authors begin their analysis of the development of this phe-
nomenon in the public sector with a discussion of "the late 1970's 
explosion in ethics reform-a sort of cultural Big Bang, which began 
on August 5, 1974, in Washington, D.C."200 They discuss a number 
193. ld. at xi. 
194. ld. at 8. 
195. ld. at 160. 
196. ld. at 5. 
197. See id. at 23 ("When everything's a scandal, nothing's a scandal."). 
198. See id. ("As the ethical rules become more and more technical . . . more 
and more people scheme to avoid them, and the rules are delegitimized."). 
199. See, e.g., id. at 24-25 ("When Congress and an army of independent or 
special prosecutors are incessantly investigating violations by just about everyone, 
it is unlikely the public will maintain confidence in either the investigated or the 
investigators."). 
200. ld. at 47 (referring to this as the date of the "last great Watergate disclo-
sure"). 
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of examples of the appearance standard and the ethics establishment 
at work. In addition, the authors direct a particularly withering 
analysis at the Office of Government Ethics. 201 The Office has the 
unenviable task of translating an array of criminal statutes, civil 
provisions, and executive orders into regulations that will provide 
guidance to federal employees at all levels. Not surprisingly, some of 
these regulations, and the accompanying examples, appear to be 
exceedingly complex.202 Nonetheless, it may be preferable to have 
overly specific guidance, rather than none at all. 
For present purposes, I wish to focus on Morgan and Reynolds's 
treatment of the independent counsel. They first examine the institu-
tion in somewhat general terms,particularly its operation during the 
Reagan years.203 Their critique of overzealous enforcement and un-
duly rigorous standards is linked with critiques previously discussed 
in this Article. These include the arguments that public servants are 
subjected to a harsher brand of justice, that trivial offenses are fre-
quently involved, that the use of the criminal process "turns debates 
about right and wrong into discussions of criminality,"204 and that 
incentives lead an independent counsel to pursue all possible lines of 
inquiry, if only to obtain a conviction on a "technicality."205 Equally 
interesting is an appendix entitled "The Whitewater Appearance 
Wars.,,206 This pre-Lewinsky account was one of the earliest to treat 
the Whitewater investigation as an example of "obsession.,,207 The 
authors note the possible effects of partisanship in the appointment 
process and see the entire controversy as an example of appearances 
analysis run wild. In sum, it is fair to say that Morgan and Reynolds 
view the independent counsel not as an isolated phenomenon in need 
of possible correction, but as the culmination of the broader legal and 
cultural developments that they trace throughout the book.208 
Morgan and Reynolds are not alone in subscribing to this theory. 
Current writing about government ethics and enforcement contains 
two major strands, both of which can be labeled as critical. Some 
201. See id. at 81-89; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 401-08 (1996) (establishing the Office 
of Government Ethics and prescribing its duties). 
202. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 82-86 (giving excerpts from a 
complex memorandum on "travel expenses and related gifts"). 
203. See id. at 75-80. 
204. [d. at 79. 
205. See id. at 79-80. 
206. See id. at 213-23. 
207. See id. at 213. 
208. I will not discuss their interesting analysis on how the appearance ethics 
phenomenon has spread to business and science, as that discussion is outside the 
scope of this article. See id. at 99-138. 
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writers, such as Professors Kathleen Clark and Beth Nolan, empha-
size the need for clearer rationales for government ethics rules as 
well as better drafted provisions to specifically target detrimental 
conduct. 209 
A second group of writers takes much more of a root-and-branch 
approach to current ethics rules and their enforcement. This group 
includes Suzanne Garment,210 Professor Robert Vaughn,211 and 
Professor Cynthia Farina, notably in her work as reporter for the 
American Bar Association on Government Standards.212 Garment 
refers to "the ever-growing efficiency with which our modern scandal 
production machine operates.,,213 Professor Farina warns of frus-
trating government employees and substituting paper compliance for 
values,214 while Professor Vaughn warns of a "rules-based legalistic 
version of government ethics.,,215 
The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity216 provides important empirical 
reinforcement of the above observations. This extraordinary study, 
conducted by Frank Anechiarico and James Jacobs, details the im-
pact of ethics enforcement on public administration in New York. 
The authors are critical of political corruption and its influence on 
public confidence in the basic system. Nonetheless, they "part compa-
ny with much of the mainstream literature on corruption in its unre-
flective acceptance of the reigning anticorruption project and its 
prescription for more of the same.,,217 The study indicates "that the 
mainstream anticorruption project imposes serious costs on public 
administration while failing to control corruption" in New York 
City.218 
The authors provide numerous examples of how coping with 
anticorruption measures hampers the operation of governmental 
209. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: 
An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 77; Beth Nolan, Public 
Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of 
Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 57 (1992). Professor Clark, among others, 
notes the current tendency to use ethics accusations as political weapons, indicat-
ing that the proper formulation of ethical standards becomes all the more impor-
tant. See Clark, supra, at 58. 
210. See GARMENT, supra note 11. 
211. See Vaughn, supra note 78, at 417. 
212. See Cynthia Farina, Keeping Faith: Government Ethics & Government Eth· 
ics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 340 (1993). 
213. GARMENT, supra note 11, at 6. 
214. See Farina, supra note 212, at 290. 
215. Vaughn, supra note 78, at 410. 
216. ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note 32. 
217. Id. at xiii. 
218. Id. 
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agencies yet fails to produce any higher level of honesty. This leads 
them to conclude that "we now have a corruption-control problem as 
well as a corruption problem.,,219 
My own view is that the root-and-branch approach goes too far. 
For example, it is not the case that people are prosecuted for appear-
ances of impropriety. They are prosecuted for violations of criminal 
statutes. Laws like those prohibiting bribery and conflicts of interest 
do reflect appearance concerns, but they specify particular criminal 
conduct. The desire to preserve public confidence represents an im-
portant goal and certainly justifies the creation of more specific stan-
dards based on this general goal. As Professor Nolan explains, "the 
public can judge the effectiveness of government only by reference to 
what it sees.,,220 There is also the question of whether critics such 
as Morgan and Reynolds are on target in emphasizing the recourse of 
prosecutors to "trivial" offenses such as those that fall under the 
scope of the false-statement statute.221 Lawrence Walsh discusses 
the use of these statutes in cases where prosecutors cannot reach the 
underlying more serious offense.222 Such use needs to be distin-
guished from the pursuit of offenses that are trivial in themselves, 
like a White House aide smoking marijuana. 
A fundamental weakness on the part of those who criticize the 
current state of affairs is their failure to offer any alternatives. Mor-
gan and Reynolds have Ii concluding chapter on this subject appropri-
ately titled, "Now What?,,223 They are, however, somewhat short on 
specifics. It is hard to argue with generalities such as "when an accu-
sation is made, we should expect responsibility from the accusers. A 
strong ethical system would demand more from accusers, as well as 
from the accused.,,224 Their most specific suggestion is to "limit ap-
219. Id. 
220. Nolan, supra note 209, at 78. 
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998); MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 174-
76 (discussing § 1001 and its use by federal prosecutors). 
222. See WALSH, supra note 12, at 441-42 (discussing the dismissal of more 
serious charges against Casper Weinberger, which left prosecutors with essentially 
a false statement case); see also Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A 
View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2346-47 (1998) (raising the possibility that 
there are more false statements in cases involving political figures than in ordi-
nary white collar crime cases). 
223. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 199-211. 
224. Id. at 205; see Jordan B. Hansell, Book Note, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1778, 1790 
(1998) (reviewing PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF 
IMPROPRIETY (1997)) ("[The authors'] proposals are somewhat simplistic. In the end, 
they amount to little more than: 'Quit using the appearance standard."'). It should 
be noted, however, that the reviewer agrees with Morgan and Reynolds's critique 
of the independent counsel. See id. at 1789-90. 
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pearance ethics to those narrow areas where it is appropriate, sectors 
involving specialized officials who are supposed to make nonpolitical 
decisions. Judges, for example, or baseball umpires. In other cases, 
we need to focus on substance and motive, even if doing so is harder 
than relying on appearances."225 At times, one finds in the work of 
the counterrevolutionaries a certain nostalgia for the good old days of 
Boss Tweed. 226 However, I think that it is not enough to say "trust 
us." Rather, the question is how to move from a period of mistrust to 
its opposite. As Morgan and Reynolds freely admit, there simply are 
no "quick fixes.,,227 Certainly we need both rules and effective en-
forcement. The question of how to resolve the dilemma between gen-
eral principles only, on the one hand, and excessive legalism on the 
other, is not new. Perhaps, however, the counterrevolutionaries are 
performing a major service by calling attention to a state of imbal-
ance between the two. Within the universe of ethics rules, it is cer-
tainly important to focus on as narrow a tailoring as possible.228 At 
the same time, I think that a number of ethics rules and criminal 
statutes based on government-ethics goals, such as those banning 
gratuities, will continue to be broad in scope because of their prophy-
lactic character. Moreover, they will reflect a substantial amount of 
what can only be called appearances concerns. 
J also am concerned that there is a risk of the counterrevolution-
ary approach down playing the importance of a government that is 
highly ethical and free from corruption. It is clear in both the third 
world and developed countries that a government that cannot be 
trusted leads to public cynicism and a turning away from basic insti-
tutions. Anechiarico and Jacobs recognize this: 
Corruption is not harmless. We recognize that in some societies and 
at some points in history, corruption has totally demoralized society, 
eviscerated the government's legitimacy, and led to coups, revolu-
tions, and societal collapse or, on occasion, simply to cynicism, alien-
ation, and stagnation. For these reasons, corruption can hardly be 
legalized or ignored; it must be condemned, investigated, and pun-
ished.229 
225. MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 203. 
226. See, e.g., GARMENT, supra note 11, at 26-27. 
227. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 199. 
228. See, e.g., George D. Brown, The Constitution as an Obstacle to Government 
Ethics-Reformist Legislation after National Treasury Employees Union, 37 WM. & 
MARy L. REV. 979, 1023-32 (1995) (discussing concepts of tailoring and prophylac-
tic provisions). 
229. ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note 32, at 193. Professor Sunstein recog-
nizes the dangers of corruption, but argues that "[ilt is not, however, one of the 
more serious problems facing American Government, either now or in the foresee-
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It is ironic that the rest of the world is following America's lead on 
the subject of corrupt foreign practices while many of our own think-
ers are calling for th~ dismantling of the domestic anticorruption 
structure. Morgan and Reynolds, for example, demonstrate the risk 
of trivializing corruption by contending that the country's preoccupa-
tion with Oliver North helped avoid dealing with "real" issues. 23o 
Perhaps the counterrevolutionaries would respond that they are 
simply calling attention to the fact that we have gone too far. There 
is, however, a real risk of dismantling the present institutional struc-
ture without having anything to put in its place.231 
How does all of this bear on the debate over the independent coun-
sel? Certainly the institution is an appearance-based one in that it 
rests on the assumption that the public cannot or will not rely on the 
Department of Justice to prosecute certain cases. In addition, some of 
the specific issues raised by writers such as Morgan and Reynolds, 
including harsh treatment, prosecution for trivial offenses, and 
disincentives to public service are at the heart of the debate over the 
independent counsel. Still, their real focus is on the day-to-day inter-
action between ethics rules and the work of federal officials, most of 
whom will never see an independent counsel. The same observation 
applies, a fortiori, to employees and officials of state and local gov-
ernments as well as those in other sectors. One might view the inde-
pendent counsel as a unique institution aimed at investigating a 
narrow band of high officials whose connection to the administration 
requires that their questionable actions receive different treatment 
than that of federal public servants as a whole. The public almost 
certainly is not exposed to the latter group's set of ethics-related 
issues, particularly as the counterrevolutionaries describe them. 
What the public is exposed to, often on the front page, is the inde-
pendent counsel. Negative popular perception of Judge Starr may 
constitute the beginning of a broad-based ethics backlash that mir-
rors growing elite opinions expressed by the counterrevolution. Thus, 
the end of the independent counsel might be a first step in the coun-
terrevolution. It is clear that some members of this school desire that 
outcome. 232 
able future." Sunstein, supra note 52, at 2282·83. 
230. See MORGAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 173 (discussing JAMES 
FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS 133-34 (1996)). 
231. AI3 I suggested earlier, "trust us" may not, at present, be the answer. See 
supra text accompanying notes 226-27. 
232. See, e.g., GARMENT, supra note 11, at 302. 
The office of the independent counsel, that jewel in the post-Watergate 
crown, has become more trouble, more expense, and more danger than it 
HeinOnline -- 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 472 1998-1999
472 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vo1.51:433 
The Appearance of Impropriety is unquestionably a valuable con-
tribution to the debate. More than anything else, it provides an intel-
lectual frame of reference for any consideration of the independent 
counsel statute. Although current writing about the institution does 
not usually make the connection, I think that incorporating the coun-
terrevolutionary theme can enrich the discussion, even though I do 
not agree with the direction in which it would lead. 
III. IN DEFENSE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 
In Section I of this Article and in my discussion of the Appearance 
of Impropriety, I have highlighted the arguments against the inde-
pendent counsel and their intellectual foundations. Clearly, if the 
institution is to be re-authorized, its defenders will have to rebut 
those arguments. This is not an impossible task, although thus far, 
the opponents have been more vocal than the proponents. This sec-
tion critiques the critiques. To have an honest debate it is essential 
that one recognize their merits, but also their serious flaws. Matters 
are simply not as one-sided as the opponents of the institution would 
contend. Take, for example, the argument that the independent 
counsel's report is subject to abuse.233 There are dangers in allow-
ing the possible use of a public and widely-disseminated report to 
achieve what could not be done before a grand jury or a trial jury. 
This accusation has been particularly levied with some force against 
Judge Walsh.234 Nonetheless, there are several responses to criti-
cisms of the reporting requirement and its use. 
The first revolves around· the entire issue of accountability.235 
Congress, the public, and the Special Division, will want to know the 
actions of an independent counsel and whether they were justified. 
Those who criticize the report requirement are likely to also criticize 
the cost and worth of independent counsel proceedings. Yet, the re-
port is the primary way of knowing whether those costs were justi-
fied. I think it is also inconsistent to argue that one can rely on the 
[d. 
is worth. It has done a good job of investigating a number of cases that 
would also have been investigated well, and occasionally better, by ordi-
nary prosecutors. And in a test like Iran-[C]ontra, it has proved incapa-
ble of reasonable self-discipline or maintaining a sense of proportion. The 
office has a vast capacity for making big scandals out of smaller ones, 
and this is something we no longer need. 
233. See O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 496·501. 
234. See id. at 497·99. 
235. See, e.g., id. at 493·501; HARRIGER, supra note 16, at 163 ("The link be· 
tween the press, the public, and the final report is perceived by independent coun· 
sel to provide an important measure of accountability in the arrangement."). 
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accountability of the normal prosecutorial processes while criticizing 
the independent counsel for providing a broad range of information 
about the nature of investigations.236 Assuming no independent 
counsel mechanism, would the Department of Justice carry out the 
same investigations? How would this situation permit public judg-
ment without public knowledge, without public awareness of the 
investigations and their results? Moreover, it must be emphasized 
that the kind of cases we are talking about are likely to be well 
known regardless of who is investigating them.237 Recent foreign 
political donations that have been under extensive investigation by 
"regular" prosecutorial entities and congressional committees have 
certainly been a matter of public knowledge without the appoint-
ment, let alone any report, of an independent counse1.238 It may be 
true that in some instances reports have been overused and have 
caused subjects to suffer damages that might not have occurred dur-
ing normal prosecutorial processes. "Leaks," however, are not uncom-
mon during normal prosecutions. Furthermore, some reports have 
remained sealed. Perhaps the answer to the legitimate concerns 
about the report is not to abolish the requirement, but as Professor 
Cox said, as quoted by Professor Gormley, and reiterated by Cox 
himself in a recent article: "In the end, independent counsel must see 
their function not as pursuit of a target to be wounded or destroyed, 
but as an impartial inquiry with as much concern for public exonera-
tion of the innocent as for indictment of the guilty.,,239 
Another flawed argument is that of the excessive cost of the stat-
ute. In the hands of critics such as James Carville this argument has 
become a potent tool in the opposition to Judge Starr and is certain 
to playa major role in the renewal debate. It is true that some inde-
pendent counsel investigations have been lengthy and costly. Howev-
er, it may be misleading to compare the work of the independent 
counsel with the operations of a normal prosecutorial office such as 
236. See O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 490 (stating that a regular prosecutor in 
a controversial case can "point to his record to justify prosecutorial decisions"). 
Justifying decisions certainly implies revealing them. 
237. See, e.g., Don Van Natta, Jr., Democrat Cites Early Suspicion Over Dona· 
tions, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1998, at Al (discussing early concerns by Democratic 
officials about controversial fund-raising operations ·from foreign sources); see also 
Philip B. Heymann, Four Unresolved Questions About the Responsibilities of an 
Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2120 (1998); Ornstein, supra note 80, at 
2191 (contending that the independent counsel process begins with press reports). 
238. See Justice Delayed and Derailed, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at AI. In-
deed, much of the debate about this matter has focused on the decision by the 
Attorney General whether to appoint an independent counsel at all. See id. 
239. Archibald Cox, Curbing Special Counsels, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1998, at 
A37. 
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that of a United States Attorney. Professor O'Sullivan notes that two 
United States Attorneys' offices with budgets similar to that of Judge 
Walsh handled "the filing of a total of approximately 8,000 criminal 
and· civil cases and other unquantified investigative activity."24o A 
large percentage of those filings and activities may represent rela-
tively minor cases or matters that were settled early on.241 Still, the 
point stands that an independent counsel investigation is more ex-
pensive than the alternative. However, as Judge Walsh contends, a 
major investigation of a high-ranking political figure is difficult. 
Given what is at stake, the subjects are likely to throw everything 
available at the independent counsel. Clearly, one of the issues swirl-
ing about Whitewater is whether it is Judge Starr's fault that he has 
spent so much time and money or the President's fault for making 
him do so, for example, by litigating a wide range of claims of privi-
lege. 242 
Independent counsel proceedings are by no means the only ones 
that consume time and money. Professor Gormley reports that before 
becoming a special prosecutor, Archibald Cox reflected on the fact 
that it had taken Owen Roberts six years to handle the Teapot Dome 
scanda1.243 Of course, that was a form of special prosecution. The 
eight-year investigation of Congressman Joseph McDade, however, 
was not. Indeed, a recent news account of this prosecution reads like 
a critical description of an independent counsel: 
For eight years, federal prosecutors dug for evidence, probed wit-
nesses, wired informants, and issued subpoenas looking for proof 
that Rep[resentative] Joseph McDade had violated the law. After a 7 
1/2 week trial, the Pennsylvanian Republican was acquitted in Au-
gust 1996 of charges that he had accepted $100,000 in bribes from 
defense firms and lobbyists in exchange for supporting millions of 
dollars' worth of government contracts. Several jurors later publicly 
declared themselves incredulous at the weakness of the 
government's case.244 
240. O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 502-03 (citation omitted). 
241. See Lawrence E. Walsh, The Need for Renewal of the Independent Counsel 
Act, 86 GEO. L.J. 2379, 2387-88 (1998) (stating that cost comparison between the 
two types of offices is "irrelevant"). 
242. See, e.g., The Metabolism of Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, §4, at 14 
("It is striking, for example, that the President's lawyers and political spokesmen 
keep relying on the scorched-earth tactics that work in the compact time frame of 
a campaign."); see also Smaltz, supra note 222, at 2344-46 (discussing jurisdictional 
challenges as a source of frequent delay when an investigation expands). 
243. See GORMLEY, supra note 2, at 252. 
244. T.R. Goldman, For McDade, Life Fuels Legislation, After Acquittal, Assault 
on Prosecutor's Reach, LEGAL TIMES, May 18, 1998, at 25. 
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Regular prosecution can also be expensive. Judge Walsh, along 
with other supporters of the independent counsel, notes that '''the 
Justice Department spent nineteen million dollars to prosecute [Gen-
eral Manuel] Noriega in a much less complex case.",245 
Another flaw implicit in arguments against the independent coun-
sel statute is the apparent assumption that normal prosecutors regu-
larly behave in an appropriate manner whereas the independent 
counsel statute is riddled with mechanisms that facilitate inappropri-
ate behavior, for example, concentrating on only one individua1.246 
Of course, prosecutors differ. A random sample of the defense bar 
would frequently suffice by itself to dissolve any notions of the prose-
cutor as a benign institution. No independent counsel has been more 
controversial than Rudolph Giuliani when he was the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York. This position is a 
powerful one in its own right, regardless of the incumbent. It is 
doubtful that any independent counsel has had a similar degree of 
power and reach.247 
Prosecutorial abuse may be in the eye of the beholder, but one 
could certainly find it in ABSCAM, another matter that cannot be 
laid at the doorstep of the independent counsel because it was car-
ried out by the "normal" forces of investigation and prosecution.248 
The criticism that indepertdent counsels operate in a skewed fashion 
by focusing on only one individual is often incorrect. They may quick-
ly broaden their investigation as evidence uncovers a pattern of 
wrongdoing that goes beyond the initial triggering facts. It often 
appears that those who criticize an independent counsel's tendency to 
be overly narrow would also oppose efforts by independent counsels 
to broaden their investigations. This is despite the fact that a broad-
er investigation would make better use of time and resources and 
could indicate the extent of the corruption in which the covered per-
son and those surrounding him engaged. 
The articulation of the one-matter criticism might lead observers 
of the process to forget that Congress considered and rejected the 
245. WALSH, supra note 12, at 431 (quoting Senator William Cohen). 
246. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 475, 477, 485, 488, 493 (discussing 
various incentives conferred by the statute to independent counsels). 
247. See Todd S. Purdum, Former Special Counsels See Need to Alter Law that 
Created Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at Al ("'The United States Attorney for 
the Southern District has almost unlimited power .... "') (quoting former Indepen-
dent Counsel Whitney North Seymour). 
248. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 607-13 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(involving an FBI sting operation conducted against a United States Senator that 
included offers of stock in corporations supposedly financed by "Abdul Enterprises," 
a fictional entity). 
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concept of a "permanent public attorney" with a somewhat general 
range of jurisdiction.249 At times, the critics seem to be saying not 
so much that the office of the independent counsel is a bad thing as 
that the wrong people are occupying it because the wrong people are 
appointing them. A good example of this somewhat condescending 
approach is a recent piece by Professor Heymann entitled Predatory 
Special Prosecutors. 250 He criticizes the chair of the Special Divi-
sion, Judge David B. Sentelle, for his "unusually active and partisan 
political background.,,251 Furthermore, Heymann notes that Ken-
neth Starr "had, and has maintained, close professional and personal 
ties with a number of organizations that can fairly be said to oppose 
President Clinton passionately."252 These observations underscore 
Heymann's emphasis on the need for an independent counsel to "ap-
pear to be[ ] unbiased and nonpartisan.,,253 He further criticizes 
"predatory" independent counsels for overly zealous pursuits of their 
subjects.254 These observations are strikingly reminiscent of Profes-
sor Heymann's description of the partisan background of Professor 
Cox and his ambitious staff. 
Some critics, such as Professor O'Sullivan, recognize that the mat-
ter is inherently political, or at least highly politicized, and recom-
mend leaving the kind of issues currently triggering the use of the 
independent counsel to the political process.255 As an important 
249. See HARRIGER, supra note 16, at 66. Professor Harriger refers to the argu-
ments of Lloyd Cutler and Samuel Dash in favor of such an office. 
Id. 
Dash envisioned the permanent office as one that would first receive 
complaints from people who had been wronged by the executive branch 
and then investigate these complaints. If the allegations constituted a 
prima facie case, the attorney would notify the attorney general, who 
would then be expected to proceed with the case. If the attorney general 
failed to do so, the public attorney could take the proceedings before a 
federal district court and request an order making the attorney general 
show why the public attorney should not become the special prosecutor in 
the case. 
Cutler, described by Professor Harriger as "convinced that the conflict of 
interest inherent in the executive investigating itself was the core of the problem 
and that this problem could be solved through an independent investigatory appa-
ratus," felt that "'a continuing public prosecutor might go a long way to restore 
public confidence in our institutions.'" Id. at 65-66. 
250. Philip Heymann, Predatory Special Prosecutors, WASH. POST, June 12, 
1997, at A23. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. See id. (arguing that high government officials should not "be subject to 
being 'hunted' in ... a single-minded way"J. 
255. See O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 509 (emphasizing the political nature of 
HeinOnline -- 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 477 1998-1999
1999] INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE 477 
premise of this argument, critics assert that the system "worked" in 
Watergate given the fact that the political process was able to come 
forward with the appointment of Archibald COX.256 Apart from the 
extraordinary nature of the underlying matter, this assertion ignores 
the particular constellation of political forces present in 1973. As 
Professor Gormley's book makes clear, President Nixon could not 
appoint any attorney general without the agreement of the Demo-
cratic-controlled Senate.257 Democrats conditioned their agreement 
on the appointment of a special prosecutor in whom they had confi-
dence.258 Nixon had little choice in the matter, and his selection of 
Elliot Richardson was closely scrutinized.259 
Beyond dubious premises, there is the question of how the political 
process would substitute for the work of the independent counsel. 
Impeachment is a rarely invoked option, despite recent events. Over-
sight hearings are likely to turn into something close to a partisan 
shouting match, with defenders and opponents of the targeted official 
arrayed along party lines.26o Moreover, there is a serious question 
whether administration officials are as subject to political account-
ability as the critics of the independent counsel contend. For exam-
ple, it is extremely unlikely that Attorney General Janet Reno will 
run for public office in 1999 or thereafter. Moreover, President 
Clinton cannot run for another term. As Judge Walsh explains, "most 
officials in the executive branch are not vulnerable to the electorate. 
Because the president and vice president are the only elected mem-
bers of the executive branch, only they can be directly thrown out by 
dissatisfied voters.,,261 
Alternatively, Professor O'Sullivan makes the intriguing sugges-
investigation of high-ranking public officials and recommending that primary re-
sponsibility for the process be given to Congress or a congressional delegee). 
256. See id. at 505-06. 
257. See GoRMLEY, supra note 2, at 244 (explaining that President Nixon had 
to "placate . . . a skeptical Congress" for an appointment to take place). 
258. See id. at 241-43 (discussing Senate reaction to Cox). 
259. See id. at 232-44 (stating that "[u]nless Richardson gave stronger guaran-
tees of independence for the special prosecutor, 'he wasn't going through'") (quoting 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy). 
260. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Committee Republicans Accuse White House of 
. 'Stonewalling,' N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 7, 1997, at A29 (pointing out ''bare-knuckled ... 
partisanly divided Senate and House hearings" in campaign finance investigation); 
cf WALSH, supra note 12, at 522 (noting the difficulty of focusing public hearings). 
261. WALSH, supra note 12, at 522. Judge Walsh also notes the infrequency of 
the use of the impeachment power and its "important limitations." See id. In his 
view, "[t]o avoid legislative paralysis, Congress must continue its current practice 
of impeaching only the very highest officials. Thus, impeachment cannot serve as a 
direct deterrent for subordinates." [d. at 523. 
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tion that "Congress, or a delegee of Congress ... should be the cen-
tral actor here, not a criminal prosecutor.,,262 She notes the problem 
of partisanship in congressional committee investigations, and pro-
poses that Congress "consider delegating its investigative function to 
a strictly bipartisan panel of lawyers and investigators, which would 
have a circumscribed mandate (in terms of subject matter as well as 
available time and resources).,,263 Although I find Professor 
O'Sullivan's article to be the most cogent presentation of arguments 
opposing the independent counsel statute, this particular solution 
strikes me as a tepid alternative for addressing the kind of wrongdo-
ing likely to be at issue. 
Indeed, the nature and role of the prosecutor in general leads to 
one of the central questions in the debate: If we are going to use a 
prosecutor, should it always be the normal mechanism or is there a 
case for "independence" some of the time? If one answers the latter 
question in the affirmative, the issue then becomes one of how to 
achieve that independence. Some critics suggest that we should not 
use the prosecutorial avenue at all i'f our overall goal is to reach 
judgments about fitness for office.264 However, shifting the matter 
from an independent counsel to a regular prosecutor, or some variant 
of the same, keeps the matter within the criminal justice system. I 
view that as the appropriate arena if ~t appears that a criminal stat-
ute has been violated. A United States Attorney who prosecutes a 
state official for extortion under the Hobbs Ace65 judges that 
official's fitness for office to the same extent as an independent coun-
sel who investigates a cabinet official for false statements. The notion 
that only an independent counsel criminalizes ethical or political 
decisions is erroneous.266 
I point out these flaws in the critics' arguments to suggest that the 
matter is far from settled, and that the drumbeat of criticism cur-
rently surrounding the institution has considerably less force than 
meets the eye. What factors will, then, be determinative in the de-
bate? Certainly, partisanship will playa role. Historically, Republi-
cans have opposed the institution while Democrats have been the 
primary force in its creation and perpetuation.267 These OpInIOnS, 
262. O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 509. 
263. Id. 
264. See, e.g., id. at 507-08. 
265. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1997 & Supp. 1998). 
266. See Michael R. Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: The 
Redefinition of the Mail FraudStatute.26AM.CRIM. L. REV. 181, 186 (1988) (con-
tending that as mail fraud prosecution expanded, "[tlhe quintessential type of 
intangible rights case . . . involved the protection of ethical standards as an end 
in itself'). 
267. See O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 472 (noting that some Republican views 
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however, have not remained constant within the parties. In Decem-
ber of 1997, the New York Times reported that President Clinton 
was "[f1oremost among converts from supporter to opponent."268 
While partisanship can affect a legislator's position on the institu-
tion, it may be hard to take a stance that can be labeled as pro-cor-
ruption. That is why opponents need to elevate arguments such as 
those that I have labeled "civil liberties issues,,269 to a credible posi-
tion. 
One might expect that empirical evidence detailing the perfor-
mance of independent counsels would be the most important variable 
in this debate. However, as Professor O'Sullivan notes, "this is an 
issue that empirical study is unlikely to resolve.'>27O The debate over 
the independent counsel is a classic example of the adage "that 
where one stands depends on where one sits." As my discussion of 
Firewall indicates,271 it is possible to view Judge Walsh as either a 
single-minded partisan (despite his professed Republican allegiances) 
bent on tackling the presidency, or as a conscientious public servant 
whose good-faith investigation was stymied by a cover-up orchestrat-
ed by powerful forces. No doubt, similar observations and contentions 
can be made about other occupants of the position. Many in Congress 
will present the debate over the independent counsel statute's future 
as a referendum on Judge Starr's performance. 
The other important variable may be the extent to which there is 
still support for the proposition that the Department of Justice can-
not be depended upon to conduct an impartial investigation and 
prosecution in particular cases. 272 Certainly, much of Attorney Gen-
eral Reno's conduct during 1998 regarding allegations of campaign 
finance impropriety has served to reinforce this perception.273 One 
can envisage a congressional debate in which the proponents of the 
independent counsel statute (some of whom called for her impeach-
on the independent counsel statute changed from opposition to support). 
268. Stephen Labaton, Rethinking a Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1997, at AID; 
see also Lewis, supra note 180 (reporting that the Clinton administration initially 
supported renewing the independent counsel statute because it believed that it had 
"higher standards" than the Bush administration). 
269. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. 
270. O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 476. 
271. See supra notes 131-91 and accompanying text. 
272. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 476 (discussing the link between 
support for the independent counsel statute and the perception that the Depart-
ment of Justice cannot always be counted on to conduct impartial investigations 
and prosecutions). 
273. See Janet Reno May Finally Get It, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 4, 1998, at A,22 
(stating that the Attorney General "should stop stonewalling and try to salvage 
her own reputation and that of the Justice Department"). 
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ment) cite the case of the politicized attorney general, while the op-
ponents cite the example of the runaway independent counsel. It is 
not clear that either side will have the political muscle and intellec-
tual capital to prevail. One scenario is a tacit agreement to let the 
matter die. Alternatively, the natural tendency of the political pro-
cess in matters such as this-to seek a compromise-may come into 
play. Therefore, I will devote the remainder of this Article to the 
question of whether it is possible to make changes in the law that 
mollify the critics while preserving something akin to the indepen-
dent counsel statute in its current form. 
IV. ALTERATION: A REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO ABOLITION? 
The lists of both opponents and proponents of the independent 
counsel statute contain many distinguished names. A fair number of 
the latter, including Judge Walsh, condition their support on changes 
in the statute. At the end of Firewall, Judge Walsh states: 
[T]hat the independent counsel system has been integrated success-
fully into our constitutional framework. The statute must be re-
newed every five years, which provides regular opportunities for 
amendments. But, inasmuch as the Supreme Court upheld the stat-
ute in Morrison v. Olson, it would be regrettable to endanger the 
statute's constitutionality by any radical change.274 
These views reflect the prevailing sentiment expressed by former 
independent counsels surveyed by the New York Times.275 The 
same sentiment is probably present, to varying degrees, among mem-
bers of Congress.276 An important initial question concerns "how 
much play there is in the line"; that is, to what degree can the stat-
ute be changed while retaining its independent character? Numerous 
274. WALSH, supra note 12, at 528 (citation omitted). 
275. See Purdum, supra note 247. The article reported that interviews with 
seven former independent counsels "produced broad consensus that the statute was 
needed but might have to be overhauled if it was to be renewed by Congress 
when it expires." Id. The only exception to this view was expressed by Joseph 
DiGenova, who stated that prosecutors are forced to bring "an unnatural degree of 
targeted attention to the case." Id. 
276. See, e.g., Chris Black, Both Parties Push Change in Counsel Law, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1997, at Al ("The independent counsel law ... has become so 
steeped in partisanship that Democrats and Republicans alike are calling for 
change."); David A. Strauss, After the Clinton Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1998, at 
A27 ("The law establishing the independent counsel will expire in mid-1999, and 
the smart money says the office will not survive in anything like its current 
form."). But see Lewis, supra note 180 ("[Elxtinction seems like a real possibility; 
Congress appears to have little appetite for renewing the law."). Of course, it is 
the current Congress that will make the decision. 
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incidental changes would probably amount to little more than "tin-
kering.,,277 Indeed, some of the proposed changes are essentially cos-
metic. There are possible alterations, however, that can reduce the 
statute's scope and, thereby, respond to some of the recurrent criti-
cisms. Perhaps the most important question is whether it is possible 
to increase the attorney general's role and discretion while preserv-
ing the independence of the independent counsel. In this section I 
will discuss the major proposals for change, focusing where possible 
on specific legislation filed in the Congress that preceded the one 
that will actually consider renewal.278 
A. Limiting the Number of Covered Crimes 
One of the most popular proposals for change is the reduction of 
the number of crimes the possible commission of which could trigger 
an independent counsel investigation, along with the corollary notion 
that the number of covered persons should also be reduced.279 A fre-
quent theme is that use of the independent counsel should be limited 
to instances of abuse of power. As Lawrence Walsh recently stated, 
"[i]t should be limited to misuse of Government power and should not 
include personal mistakes or indiscretions."28o Clearly, proponents 
of this change are not advocating "abuse of power" as a free standing 
norm of conduct. Many citizens might feel that presidential recourse 
to White House interns for sexual gratification is a form of abuse of 
power. Such an open-ended standard would lead to the same criti-
cisms that have been levied against the "appearance of impropriety" 
standard. Thus, proponents of this change must have in mind a par-
ticular subset of federal crimes, perhaps only those that a public 
official could commit or that somehow implicate his office. Archibald 
277. See O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 505 (discussing various ways to address 
the statute's perceived problems). 
278. Representatives John Conyers, Jay Dickey, and Robert Wexler each pro-
posed changes to the independent counsel statute. See H.R. 117, 105th Congo 
(1997); H.R. 139, 105th Congo (1997); H. R. 3464, 105th Congo (1998). 
I will not discuss alternatIve mechanisms to the independent counsel such 
as Professor Kathleen Clark's discussion of a possible Inspector General for the 
White House. See Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical Government: An Inspector 
General for the White House, 49 MERCER L. REV. 553 (1998). 
279. See HARRIGER, supra note 16, at 208-14 (discussing various reform propos-
als); Purdum, supra note 247 (noting criticisms that "the law covered too many 
officials and too many potential acts of wrongdoing"). 
280. Purdum, supra note 247; see also Judicial Conference, supra note 1, at 
1530-84 (views of Jamie Gorelick); Lewis, supra note 180 (presenting Senator Carl 
Levin's views that the law should be limited to "issues involving behavior while in 
office or at least should go no farther back than the political campaign that 
. launched the administration"). 
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Cox has used the phrase, "crimes involving abuse of official power or 
improper influencing of executive, legislative or electoral deci-
sions."281 Professor Harriger advocates focusing on "[t]raditional 
public corruption laws (including those against bribery, fraud, perju-
ry, and obstruction of justice by public officials)."282 Still, the lines 
are hard to draw.283 Moreover, limiting the statute to abuse of office 
"crimes" finesses somewhat the underlying proposition that an inde-
pendent counsel is needed because the attorney general cannot be 
relied on to investigate and prosecute any crime committed by a 
covered person. Limiting coverage to crimes committed while in office 
would exclude election offenses, clearly an undesirable result. Fur-
thermore, investigating crimes committed after an official has left 
office would also present difficult problems. An important federal 
ethics provision criminalizes certain post-employment activities by 
former officials. 284 Would these be excluded? A problem also exists 
in the delineation of the crimes once there is some agreement on how 
to categorize them. I have advocated exploring an enumeration of 
covered crimes along the lines of the RICO statute.285 Another ap-
proach would involve some form of certification by the attorney gen-
eral that an independent investigation is warranted, although that 
leads back to the question of how much power she should be given to 
decide whether or not to appoint an independent counsel. 
The bill proposed by Representative Wexler uses essentially the 
Cox formulation, referring to "any Federal criminal law (other than a 
violation classified as a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction) 
which involves an abuse of official power or improper influencing of 
executive, legislative, or electoral decisions."286 Representative 
Conyers' legislation proposes a slightly more nuanced formulation: 
"'any Federal felony or any Federal misdemeanor for which there is 
an established practice of prosecution and which is alleged to have 
281. Cox, supra note 239. 
282. HARRIGER, supra note 16, at 211; see also George D. Brown, The Gratuities 
Offense and the RICO Approach to Independent Counsel Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2045, 2073 (1998) (including in the notion of abuse "ensuring integrity in officials' 
dealings with the processes of government and the laws that regulate those pro-
cesses" and "violations of the election laws, especially those relating to campaign 
finance"). 
283. See Judicial Conference, supra note 1, at 1529-35 (remarks of William P. 
Barr). 
284. See 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. 1998). 
285. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (Supp. 1998); see also Brown, supra note 282, at 
2073-74 (suggesting RICO's "covered crimes" approach as a potential model for the 
independent counsel statute). The same approach is used in the statutes prohibit-
ing forms of money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (Supp. 1998). 
286. R.R. 3464 § 3. 
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occurred or commenced while the target of the investigation was in 
office.'"287 The latter formulation would need to be amended to in-
clude campaign offenses. The "established practice of prosecution" 
language appears to be a reflection of the view that independent 
counsels sometimes strain to find indictable offenses.288 It does, 
however, suffer from a substantial degree of vagueness and would 
not be of much help in the case of newly-created offenses. Both for-
mulations raise the problem mentioned above of how to determine 
whether a crime constitutes an abuse of office and who makes that 
determination. 
B. Reducing the Number of Covered Persons 
One suggestion that is equally popular among academic and other 
observers is limiting the number of persons covered under the stat-
ute.289 This may be a desirable and workable example of tailoring 
the law more narrowly to reach those cases that most seriously need 
it. It is far from clear that we need an independent counsel to inves-
tigate "the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.,,290 
Moreover, the provision permitting the attorney general to trigger 
the mechanism whenever she determines that a Department of Jus-
tice investigation "may result in a personal, financial, or political 
conflict of interest" constitutes a safety valve for any persons who 
might otherwise escape the net through a reduction.291 Disagree-
ment arises over the suggestion of limiting the coverage of the stat-
ute when the analysis turns to who should remain covered. Archibald 
Cox refers to "the paradigmatic case of the President and the few 
cases of next importance-charges against the Vice President, a key 
Cabinet officer or a high-ranking member of the White House 
staff."292 Others would include some or all cabinet members.293 
287. H.R. 117 § 4. 
288. See Heymann, supra note 237, at 2125-26 (pointing out the tendency of 
independent counsels to use tremendous resources to investigate allegations of 
relatively minor crimes). 
289. See, e.g., HARRIGER, supra note 16, at 209; Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 
51, at 541; O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 475, 505; Purdum, supra note 247. 
290. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(5) (1994). 
291. See id. § 591(c)(1) (Supp. 1998). 
292. Cox, supra note 239. 
293. Compare Lewis, supra note 180 (reporting that some proposals would limit 
the scope to the heads of the Treasury, State, Defense, and Justice departments), 
with Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 51, at 541 (stating that there is a general 
consensus that the statute apply to the President and his Cabinet) (citing INDE-
PENDENT COUNSEL SUBCOMM. OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION OF THE ABA 
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Following Professor Cox's lead, the Wexler bill limits "the individuals 
covered under the Independent· Counsel provisions of the Ethics in 
Government Act to the President, Vice President, Cabinet and a 
handful of Executive Branch senior staff."294 Neither the Conyers 
nor the Dickey bill appears to follow this approach. However, it does 
seem to represent a workable means of limiting the scope of the Act 
and, at least, responds in part to the criticism that some public offi-
cials are receiving a harsher brand of justice. 
The theory of a narrow targeting reflects the contrary concern that 
there are some whose high position makes it likely that they will 
receive a milder brand of justice. It should be noted that neither a 
reduction of the number of covered persons nor a reduction in cov-
ered crimes would affect the underlying operation of the Act once 
triggered. Therefore, it is not surprising that the most difficult ques-
tion is whether to amend the statute by giving the attorney general a 
greater role in the process. 
C. The Attorney General's Role and the "Triggering" Problem 
The fundamental premise of the independent counsel mechanism 
is that there is an a priori class of cases in which the Department of 
Justice cannot be relied on to investigate and prosecute. Throughout 
the existence of the mechanism, congressional critics have charged 
attorneys general of both parties with overuse of the limited discre-
tion that they do possess not to invoke the mechanism.295 On the 
other hand, one of the most frequent criticisms of the Act is its al-
most automatic operation. According to Professor O'Sullivan, "the 
statutory trigger is designed so that the attorney general has little 
choice but to over-refer cases for appointment of an IC.,,296 This 
criticism resonates throughout current discussions and proposals to 
improve the Act. One observer has called this "the most hotly con-
tested part of the law.,,297 The two recurring themes of this critique 
are (1) that the attorney general should be given more tools at the 
preliminary stage, and (2) that the standard for appointing an inde-
pendent counsel should give the attorney general greater leeway to 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME COMM., SUMMARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Aug. 
19, 1989)). 
294. Dear Colleague letter summarizing bill (on file with the author); see H.R. 
3464 § 3(a) (reducing the number of covered individuals by striking provisions 
from the original statute). 
295. See, e.g., HARRIGER, supra note 16, at 84-85 (criticism of Attorney General 
Edwin Meese). There have been similar criticisms of Attorney General Janet Reno. 
See Lewis, supra note 180. 
296. O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 479. 
297. Lewis, supra note 180. 
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determine whether this action is warranted. As for the tools, she is 
currently barred from using grand juries, immunity, plea bargains, 
or subpoenas.298 It may well be that she could weed out cases with 
little merit if she were given at least some of these tools. On the 
other hand, there is the risk of suspects learning too much from a 
preliminary investigation so that they can thwart the independent 
counsel should there be an independent investigation.299 Moreover, 
if a case is truly frivolous, one would hope that the independent 
counsel would wrap it up quickly and discreetly. The legislative pro-
posals appear to be unanimous in granting the attorney general 
subpoena power only at this preliminary phase.aoo This may well be 
a compromise with which all sides can live. It gives the attorney 
general a greater role in the filtering process while preserving the 
essential role of the independent counsel once appointed. 
As Professor Cox has stated, the role of this individual is not "sim-
ply to prosecute."aOl Professor Cox made this comment in the con-
text of a discussion regarding the more controversial issue: what the 
attorney general must find or not find in order to move the process 
forward. Critics of the present law have charged that she is in the 
difficult position of having to prove a negative: "that there are no 
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warrant-
ed."ao2 Proposals abound for requiring some alternative formulation 
of what the attorney general should be looking for at this stage. In 
Firewall, Judge Walsh suggested that "[p]erhaps the attorney gener-
al should be required to make an additional finding that prompt 
investigation by an independent counsel is necessary in the public 
interest."aoa Lloyd Cutler has suggested changing the threshold 
finding into one of "reasonable grounds for believing that a signifi-
cant federal crime may have been committed."ao4 It was this sugges-
tion that prompted Professor Cox's emphasis on the broad role of the 
independent counsel, as well as his view that anything such as a 
"probable cause" standard would shift the balance too much in the 
298. See 28 U.S.C. § 592 (a)(2)(A) (1993). 
299. See Smaltz, supra note 222, at 2338-39 (arguing that even under current 
practice subjects gain an advantage by being on notice). 
300. See H.R. 117 § 5 (Conyers); H.R. 139 § 3 (Dickey), H.R. 3464 § 2 (Wexler). 
301. See Symposium, A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent Counsel Stat-
ute, 49 MERCER L. REV. 453, 471-72 (1998) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion] 
(remarks of Professor Cox). 
302. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1); see also Lewis, supra note 180. 
303. WALSH, supra note 12, at 526. 
304. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 301, at 470 (remarks of former White 
House Counsel Lloyd Cutler). 
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direction of the attorney genera1.305 
It is, of course, possible that semantics are not the key here,30G 
but I am inclined to think that any language that substantially 
broadens the attorney general's fact finding role will be taken as an 
opening to daylight. There could be a shift in the balance such that 
the independent counsel remains independent once appointed, but 
rarely comes into existence, even in cases that would warrant the 
institution. The issue of a change in the standard is likely to playa 
major role in any legislative consideration of current bills. Congress-
man Conyers does not appear to change the basic finding required of 
the attorney general, although he does grant her more leeway by 
eliminating the requirement that any decision not to proceed because 
the subject lacked the requisite state of mind be based on "clear and 
convincing evidence.,,307 He also proposes an increase in her author-
ity at the initial screening stage.30B Representative Wexler adopts 
the position of the critics in requiring that the attorney general, after 
a preliminary investigation, determine "that there are substantial 
grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted" as a pre-
condition to the application for an independent counse1.309 Repre-
sentative Dickey focuses on increasing the attorney general's author-
ity at the initial screening stage.3lO 
The trigger is a central issue on which compromise seems difficult. 
The essence of the current statute is that as long as there is some-
thing there or, at least, the attorney general cannot say that nothing 
is there, an independent counsel shall be appointed. To regress from 
this standard toward greater attorney general discretion may well 
take the "independent" out of the statute. For that reason, I think 
that this sort of change, unlike many of the others discussed in this 
section, runs counter to the basic thrust of the statute. I will now 
briefly consider several other proposals that will certainly play a role 
in the re-authorization debate. 
305. See id. at 471-72 (remarks of Archibald Cox). 
306. See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 51, at 544. 
307. See H.R. 117 § 6. His bill would require "a preponderance of the evidence." 
[d. 
308. See id. § 4. This increase in authority occurs through a raising of the 
threshold in cases involving noncovered covered persons when the Department of 
Justice may face a conflict of interest. 
309. H.R. 3464 § 4. 
310. See H.R. 139 § 4. He would increase the specificity of information that the 
attorney general must receive before being required to act. 
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D. Selection and Qualifications of Independent Counsels 
There is a broad spectrum of agreement that the position of inde-
pendent counsel should be full-time.3ll Current legislative proposals 
exhibit considerable support for this proposition.312 In the public 
debate, one also finds wide agreement on a requirement that any 
independent counsel have prosecutorial or similar experience.313 Ac-
cording to Whitney North Smith, "we simply cannot afford the spec-
tacle of on-the-job training in such a sensitive position.,,314 Imposing 
the requirement might not be quite so simple given the fact that 
there is a potential range of relevant experience. For example, the 
position of Director of the Federal Office of Government Ethics could 
provide the type of experience necessary to qualify an independent 
counsel in a particular case. Moreover, as noted earlier, Professor 
Cox lacked such experience.315 Curiously, of the three legislative 
proposals analyzed here, only Representative Conyers addresses the 
issue, and his proposed bill does not require a particular form of 
experience. Instead, he lists "whether the individual has substantial 
prosecutorial experience" as a factor for the Special Division to con-
sider at the time of appointment.3lG 
One can perhaps expect controversy over how a person is appoint-
ed to the position, and particularly over whether the role of the Spe-
cial Division should be altered. Lloyd Cutler has suggested that the 
president take the initial step of nominating five to ten potential 
independent counsels, subject to Senate confirmation.317 The Special 
Division would work from this list. 3lB None of the bills discussed in 
this Article go in this direction, although Representative Conyers 
takes a couple of slaps at the Special Division through requiring 
bipartisan membership and limiting ex parte communications.319 I 
do not think that the proposal for presidential appointment of inde-
311. See, e.g., Roundtable Discussion, supra note 301, at 476 (remarks of Judge 
Bell, Professor Cox, and Lloyd Cutler); see also O'Sullivan, supra note 21, at 481-
82. 
312. See H.R. 3464 § 7; H.R. 139 § 10. 
313. See, e.g., Purdum, supra note 247 (citing virtual agreement among previous 
counsels "that wide experience as a criminal prosecutor or a defense law-
yer-which Mr. Starr does not have-should be a requirement for the job"). 
314. [d. 
315. See supra note 108 and accomp'anying text. 
316. H.R. 117 § 3(e). The current statute requires the Special Division to seek 
"an individual who has appropriate experience." 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2) (1993). 
317. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 301, at 477-78 (remarks of Lloyd 
Cutler). 
318. See id. 
319. See H.R. 117 § 3(a), (c). Such communications would be permitted only if 
in writing or memorialized by a writing and would be public documents. See id. 
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pendent counsels would go far in the present climate. Moreover, it, 
like the issue of increased attorney general authority, seems to run 
counter to the goal of independence. 
E. Limiting the Cost and Duration of Independent Counsel 
Activities 
As noted earlier, and as anyone familiar with Republican criti-
cisms of Judge Walsh or Democratic criticisms of Judge Starr knows, 
issues concerning the cost and duration of independent counsel inves-
tigations are quite contentious. It is somewhat unrealistic to assume 
at the outset that one can cap either the length or the expense of a 
criminal investigation.320 Nonetheless, each of the bills discussed 
refers to temporal limitations. Two years and the possibility of exten-
sion by the court appears to be the favorite limitation.321 Represen-
tative Conyers takes an interesting approach in allowing an initial 
appointment of only six months after which the counsel must report 
back on the need for further investigation.322 The most radical pro-
posal is Representative Dickey's requirement of a specific appropria-
tion after two years.323 Any sort of periodic review and oversight 
would perhaps have the desirable result of causing the independent 
counsel to focus on issues of cost and duration. However, allowing the 
possibility of extending the investigation is essential. 
F. The Report 
The role of the report remains an important issue in virtually all 
public discourse about the independent counsel. Some have called for 
its elimination.324 Others agree with Professor Cox's emphasis on 
the potential value of the report in clearing non-guilty persons.325 
Congressman Dickey would apparently eliminate most reports by the 
independent counsel, including those that get into items that can 
320. See Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 51, at 541-43 (stating that codification 
of temporal and budgetary limitations is unrealistic because a criminal 
investigation's progress is determined by the unique factors of the specific circum-
·stances). 
321. See, e.g., H.R. 3464 § 6 (conditioning renewal on an indictment, evidence 
sufficient to justify further inquiry, or dilatory tactics by the subject). Current law 
requires a degree of review after two years. See 28 U~S.C. § 596(b)(2) (Supp. 
1998). 
322. See H.R. 117 § 3(d). . 
323. See H.R. 139 § 8. Requiring an appropriation for a specific, ongoing inves-
tigation may well raise separation of powers issues. 
324. See, e.g., Martin & Zerhusen, supra note 51, at 546-48. 
325. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 301, at 479-80 (remarks of Professor 
Cox and Judge Walsh). 
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affect individual reputations. 326 Representative Conyers proposes a 
nuanced treatment of the report, stating that it "need not contain 
information which would (A) compromise or undermine the confiden-
tiality of an ongoing investigation under this chapter, (B) adversely 
affect the outcome of any prosecution under this chapter, or (C) vio-
late the personal privacy of an individual."327 I would think it un-
wise to eliminate reporting, based on the accountability consider-
ations that I have discussed earlier. On the other hand, language 
like that of Representative Conyers would force the independent 
counsel to think about the sorts of considerations that Professor Cox 
and others have mentioned. 
G. Limiting Expansions of Jurisdiction 
Confining the jurisdiction of the independent counsel has emerged 
as something of a "sleeper" issue in the debate. There is concern 
among critics that the counsel can take the initial jurisdiction and 
run with it into what Senator Levin refers to as "unrelated mat-
ters.,,328 James McKay has also expressed the view that "there 
ought to be some way to limit the ability of an independent counsel 
to expand his or her investigation, to keep their eye on the original 
target they were initially appointed to investigate.,,329 This criti-
cism, as I have noted, runs counter to the critique that independent 
counsels have too narrow a focus. Moreover, it raises serious issues of 
resource allocation and practical operation of an investigation. Hav-
ing the independent counsel work on criminal matters that do not 
directly involve a covered person, but that have surfaced during an 
investigation of such a person, may be more sensible and cost-effec-
tive than bifurcating the nucleus of facts and referring some of them 
to the Justice Department. In any event, the legislative proposals 
under consideration here adopt the position of the critics, with a 
preference for a formulation that would limit the independent coun-
sel to matters "directly related" to the initial violations that triggered 
the appointment. 33o 
It is possible that we could end up with a "reform" proposal along 
the following lines: the statute would cover fewer people; the number 
326. See H.R. 139 § 11. 
327. H.R. 117 § 10. The provision also requires that the report "provide infor-
mation adequate to justify the expenditures which the office of that independent 
counsel has made, and indicate in general terms the state of the work of the 
independent counsel." Id. 
328. See Lewis, supra note 180. 
329. Purdum, supra note 247. 
330. See, e.g., H.R. 139 § 5. 
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of crimes that trigger it would be reduced, perhaps through an enu-
meration; the qualifications of the independent counsel would be 
further spelled out; the position would be full-time; there would be 
mechanisms to force further attention to duration and cost of inde-
pendent counsel proceedings; the attorney general would have great-
er authority, at least subpoena power, at the preliminary investiga-
tion stage; and, the report would remain a public document, but 
there would be some emphasis on exoneration and other limitations. 
The result would be a different institution, but its fundamental na-
ture and premises would remain intact. I would view such legislation 
as a positive step, but the abolitionists would not be satisfied. The 
question is whether such a bill could make it through the legislative 
process. 
Of course, it is risky to predict how Congress will deal with the 
entire issue of the independent counsel. Nonetheless, there are some 
obvious considerations. Partisanship is one, but the direction in 
which it might lead an individual legislator is not obvious. Will Re-
publicans continue their traditional hostility to the institution, espe-
cially if they see a good chance of capturing the presidency in the 
year 2000? Or will they continue in their apparent rethinking of the 
hostile position that has increased during Whitewater? As for Demo-
crats, they are in something of a Frankenstein situation. They were 
the initial and long-time champions of a mechanism that has sudden-
ly threatened to bring down their leader, if not their party. It would 
be hard for them to ignore where they stood in the past, but it is also 
hard for them to ignore what they have said about the independent 
counsel in the present. Therefore, notions of change and compromise 
may be attractive to both parties. 
CONCLUSION 
What will happen to the independent counsel is anybody's guess. 
In its short life of twenty years, this institution has proven to be an 
extraordinarily influential one despite the relatively small number of 
investigations and prosecutions.331 It may be that the political pro-
cess will simply not know how to deal with it during any re-authori-
zation debate. The result could be a quiet death, a short-term exten-
sion, or re-enactment with changes as discussed in this Article. A 
short-term extension would give Congress "breathing room" after the 
impeachment process and would permit some detachment before in-
depth review. Legal analysts have focused on what they see as seri-
331. See Purdum, supra note 247 (listing the 20 known special counsels and the 
results of their investigations). 
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ous faults in the institution, particularly its departure from normal 
prosecutorial mechanisms. These criticisms are strongly reinforced by 
the growing current of questioning our nation's approach to issues of 
government ethics. The counterrevolution that seems to be brewing 
in this field calls into question a harsh, prosecutorial approach to 
wrongdoings by public servants, and may well claim the ind~pendent 
counsel as its first victim. This intellectual trend is augmented by an 
incipient ethics backlash among the general public in response to a 
perceived unfairness in the treatment of President Clinton. The 
White House and supporters of President Clinton have made every 
effort to capitalize on this sentiment. Congress's action on the inde-
pendent counsel may be portrayed as a referendum on these events. 
The empirical evidence that one finds in the accounts of the activi-
ties of Professor Cox and Judge Walsh is, at best, mixed. On the one 
hand, there is support for an institution that can go up against en-
trenched centers of governmental power. On' the other hand, there is 
the risk that those who undertake this task may have a political 
agenda of their own, or they would not be there in the first place. I 
do not think that the latter result is inevitable, although it may have 
happened in some cases. In my view the central question in any' 
evaluation of the independent counsel is whether one accepts the 
institution's premise: that there are certain instances in which nor-
mal prosecutorial mechanisms will not work because of the status of 
the individual potentially subject to investigation and prosecution. 
We are, then, confronting the eternal question of who shall guard the 
guardians. 
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